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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

STEVE KROFT
Host of CBS' *60 Minutes*

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DOUGLAS LUTE (Retired)
Special Assistant to the President for
Afghanistan and Pakistan

EKLIL HAKIMI
Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to
the United States

SHERRY REHMAN
Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to
the United States

LIEUTENANT GENERAL KARL EIKENBERRY (Retired)
Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

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1 PROCEEDINGS

2 (4:15 p.m.)

3 MR. ERVIN: All right. Well, during the course
4 of the last session, of course, we took a look back and a
5 look forward at the Iraq War and in this session, we're
6 going to do likewise with regard to Afghanistan and
7 Pakistan as well.

8 And I cannot think of anyone better to lead that
9 discussion than Steve Kroft, who incidentally went to
10 extraordinary logistical lengths to get here today to be
11 with us. Steve Kroft has been a correspondent for *CBS*
12 *News' 60 Minutes* for 23 years, and of course, *60 Minutes*,
13 we all know, is the most watched news program on
14 television.

15 His story on insider trading in the United
16 States Congress drove the recent passage of the STOCK Act.
17 He's the only *60 Minutes* correspondent to win two Peabody
18 Awards in the same year, bringing his total number of
19 television's most prestigious award to five. One was for
20 a story on the vulnerabilities of infrastructure to
21 computer hackers, a story and an issue that's of
22 importance to us, of course, and the other was on the

1 enormous sums of money spent prolonging the lives of dying
2 Americans.

3 Steve has won television journalism's highest
4 honor, the duPont-Columbia University Journalism Silver
5 Baton twice. Please join me in welcoming Steve Kroft in
6 this terrific panel.

7 (Applause)

8 MR. KROFT: Thank you very much. We're
9 following Iraq with Afghanistan, and we have a very
10 distinguished group here today. On my left is Ambassador
11 Eklil Hakimi who is the ambassador to the United States
12 from Afghanistan. Next to him is Doug Lute, who is a
13 presidential assistant on the -- in the area of
14 Afghanistan and Pakistan, and next to him is Karl
15 Eikenberry, former ambassador to Afghanistan.

16 And we have on teleconference, Ambassador Sherry
17 Rehman, who was unable to make it today because of a prior
18 commitment, several teleconferences with the government in
19 Islamabad, but she was kind enough and wanted to be here
20 badly enough to agree to talk to us here by
21 teleconference. So you can see her sitting back there or
22 you can see her in the television monitors around the

1 room.

2 Gentlemen, I want to begin this by -- with a
3 quote from a recent article by Dexter Filkins in *The New*
4 *Yorker* published earlier this month on the situation in
5 Afghanistan.

6 Filkins writes, "After 11 years, nearly 2,000
7 Americans killed, 16,000 Americans wounded, nearly \$400
8 billion spent and more than 12,000 Afghan civilians dead
9 since 2007, the war in Afghanistan has come down to this,
10 the United States' leading mission not accomplished.
11 Objectives once deemed indispensable such as nation
12 building and counterinsurgency have been abandoned or
13 downgraded either because they haven't worked or because
14 there was no longer enough time to achieve them."

15 Do you agree with that assessment? We'll start
16 with you, Ambassador.

17 AMB. HAKIMI: With due respect, I don't agree;
18 a) because our people, they don't want to go to those dark
19 days of Civil War and also to dark days of Taliban who
20 ruled the country. And now we have strong military, we
21 have strong police forces, we have vibrant civil society,
22 we have a very active media with a liberty that you cannot

1 find within that region, and economic growth for the last
2 10 years, remarkable, and more importantly, our own
3 people, they are frustrated of war and they are thirsty of
4 peace, and they don't want to go back.

5 And if you look at that within the region
6 context, no country within the region, they want that to
7 happen. Afghanistan, as our history taught us, it's
8 located within the heart of Asia. If a heart is not
9 functioning and not pumping the blood within the system,
10 so the whole body's not working. And no country within
11 the region as far as I know, they want an Afghanistan to
12 slip back to the civil war.

13 They want Afghanistan to be integrated
14 economically within the region, and also we have signed
15 strategic partnership agreements with our key allies, with
16 the United States of America, with United Kingdom, with
17 France, Italy, Germany, Australia, India and a lot others
18 are coming -- it's in the pipeline and that will give the
19 assurance for a enduring partnership for the years to
20 come.

21 MR. KROFT: Doug Lute, you agree?

22 GEN. LUTE: I'd say Dexter Filkins has it wrong

1 on two counts. First of all, the mission is -- will not
2 yet fully accomplish. The mission against al-Qaida, the
3 core mission that President Obama has set out, which is to
4 disrupt, dismantle and eventually defeat al-Qaida, as
5 referred over the last day and a half, is within sight.
6 So it's not yet accomplished, no one is saying mission
7 accomplished, but we are saying that that mission is
8 within sight.

9 The other point where he's wrong is we're not
10 leaving. I mean people are missing this, okay. If one of
11 the major outcomes of the Chicago Summit just 2 months ago
12 was that while we're on a path to transition the security
13 league fully to Afghan responsibility in 30 months by the
14 end of 2014, even beyond 2014, we imagine at Afghan
15 invitation that there'll be a continuing, sustained U.S.
16 presence, military presence, diplomatic presence,
17 intelligence presence that will also be supplemented by a
18 presence from our NATO coalition members.

19 So the mission's not yet accomplished, but it's
20 within sight, and we're not leaving.

21 MR. KROFT: Karl Eikenberry?

22 GEN. EIKENBERRY: Thanks, Steve. I can't resist

1 -- at the outset, I was telling Steve I know I've
2 definitely left government and military service when I'm
3 comfortable sitting on the stage with television with *60*
4 *Minutes*.

5 (Laughter)

6 GEN. EIKENBERRY: Three points; first of all,
7 what do we know about the mission what we've accomplished.
8 I think back to 9/11, al-Qaida is not in Afghanistan in
9 any kind of big numbers and al-Qaida has been weakened
10 over this last decade and was dealt a very heavy blow last
11 year that was from a base in Afghanistan that that blow
12 was dealt.

13 Secondly, in terms of governance in Afghanistan,
14 fragile, but Afghanistan over the last decade has been
15 through four elections, they've been flawed elections, but
16 from an Afghan perspective, look back at 1992-1993, how
17 did power get decided at that point? It was a group of
18 warlords gathered around the capital firing rockets into
19 the city, tens of thousands of Kabulis dying, massacres
20 that have followed.

21 So from an Afghan perspective, how do politics
22 look right now? Fragile, but better than they've looked

1 in many, many years.

2 Third point about successes; in the economic-
3 social service domain, transformational in terms of
4 education. In 2001 there were a million Afghans going to
5 school. Now there's over 7 million. About 40 percent of
6 those are women. Medical care, health care services been
7 transformed; we know this. What don't we know? We don't
8 know then going forward, will these gains all hold. Will
9 there be reversals?

10 What we also do not know and then probably
11 historians will have to tell us and maybe the panel will
12 talk about this is was the ends, ways and means that the
13 Americans at least adopted for the campaign in
14 Afghanistan, were they sound.

15 The third would be just to agree with what Doug
16 had said that the mission is not over; the mission is now
17 being redefined. It's going from one where the
18 international community has very much been in the lead in
19 Afghanistan in all the critical domains to one in which
20 the Afghans are in the lead. So we're going from a
21 position of lead to a position of support. So it's a
22 change of mission, not an end of mission.

1 MR. KROFT: I want to hear what Ambassador
2 Rehman has to say about this. What is the perspective
3 from -- or from Pakistan?

4 AMB. REHMAN: Yes, thank you, Steve. I hope you
5 can hear me. I certainly share the hope and the vision
6 that members on this panel have articulated very carefully
7 that Afghanistan is looking to a future where war finally
8 comes to an end. There's clearly war fatigue in the
9 region.

10 Pakistan is committed to -- unequivocally
11 committed to maintaining the peace, security, and
12 stability, but we look forward to a time where there is a
13 modicum and measure of sustainable peace in Afghanistan.
14 We hope to support all efforts in that endeavor. And you
15 know, very quickly, I'd like to say that most important in
16 all this thread is that Afghanistan belongs to
17 Afghanistan, which is an effort that we all have to bring
18 capacity and resource to, and I say "all" because there's
19 the United States of America with its big footprint.

20 We're next door and through every difficult time
21 and challenge we have supported Afghanistan. We still
22 host the world's largest population of refugees with our

1 Afghan brothers and sisters and I stress the position of
2 sisters by saying that, you know, one of the primary
3 concerns of women all over the world, and I speak not just
4 for Pakistan, is the status and position of women in the
5 future where we hope that there is not a security vacuum
6 in areas where the ANSF or local forces are not strong
7 enough or consolidated or cohesive enough to bring to bear
8 the level of force needed to maintain the fragile gains
9 that we've mentioned here.

10 There certainly have been gains. They shouldn't
11 be reversible and we are obviously going to do our best to
12 ensure that not just our border areas but there's a
13 security vacuum there very often, those become -- they
14 don't remain sanctuaries for terrorists. So we have
15 sanctuaries on both sides, which is troubling for Pakistan
16 because it signals to us perhaps a volatility in the days
17 ahead and we're informed by -- well, 30 years ago we
18 joined the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and
19 really we -- I think that we lost the peace.

20 We may have won the war, but we lost the peace
21 there, and now we need to be in a position where if we
22 think that we have won the war, then we certainly need to

1 worry about protecting a peace that will show the way
2 forward to a secure, stable and economically viable
3 Afghanistan that can meet its own needs.

4 We may be a few miles away from that, but I
5 think our job here is to without meddling in Afghanistan
6 to ensure that it is able to remain stable, cohesive and
7 runs as inclusive a government in the future days to come
8 as possible. And certainly Pakistan is engaged in
9 important trilateral meetings at what we call the core
10 group between the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

11 We will continue to facilitate the
12 intensification of the dialogue at all levels and we
13 really hope that the level of interdiction at our border,
14 the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan
15 goes up because we are beginning to feel a little bit of
16 blow-back from redeployments, ISAF redeployments away from
17 the border in Afghanistan. And I do hope that a great
18 deal of what we look towards in the future is going to go
19 beyond the planning stages.

20 Execution of policy is crucial, and as I said,
21 maintaining the gains made by NATO-ISAF and Afghanistan in
22 these 12 years with the amount of blood and treasure spent

1 should not be wasted. That should be our main goal right
2 now and to preserve the security and stability of all
3 components of the population, which includes women.

4 MR. KROFT: Okay. I have a question for General
5 Eikenberry. I want to go back to the figures mentioned
6 here. I can see that we killed Osama bin Laden. I would
7 concede that the deterioration of that organization, al-
8 Qaida in Afghanistan has been severely damaged, but we're
9 talking huge numbers here. We're talking 2,000 Americans
10 killed, 16,000 Americans wounded, \$400 billion and we are
11 leaving a situation where the Taliban still has a very
12 robust defense.

13 They have sanctuaries in Afghanistan or in
14 Pakistan on the borders. There is still, I'm sure the
15 ambassador would agree, a great deal of corruption and I
16 don't think anybody believes that the Taliban is going to
17 be defeated in the next 2 years or that the government of
18 Pakistan is going to be functioning western-style
19 government.

20 I guess what I'm saying is are we, in effect,
21 just cutting our losses right now, because it has proven
22 to be too difficult to do all of the things that we have

1 talked about doing and too expensive, both in life and
2 blood, to continue this for an indefinite period? Isn't
3 that the reason for this -- these decisions and this
4 current policy?

5 GEN. EIKENBERRY: Now, Steve, look at the gains
6 that we have, and I won't repeat those, and I think this
7 audience is sophisticated enough to know what the baseline
8 of 2001 in Afghanistan look like. Going forward, I think
9 that the transition strategy that's been outlined by NATO,
10 by the United States and agreed to by the Afghans,
11 sanctioned by the United Nations is a sound way ahead. Is
12 it risk-free? No, absolutely not.

13 There's challenges with Pakistan right now. If
14 Pakistan is not on side, so to speak, this transition
15 becomes much more problematic in terms of treasure and
16 more lives. There is challenges with the Afghan National
17 Security Forces with their sustainability and their
18 capabilities. There is challenges on the economic domain
19 that as the level of international largess and aid starts
20 to decline over the next several years, it's going to have
21 a very severe shock effect on the Afghan economy.

22 And fourth and finally, there's problems with

1 Afghan governance. There are problems with corruption.
2 There's problems with accountability of the government,
3 but to say that at this point, then we need to continue to
4 double down on our efforts, Steve, I think we're at a
5 point in the United States now where -- you know, look at
6 our own economic problems, one -- something that really
7 struck me coming home from so much time overseas is the
8 extent of our economic problems.

9 We've got infrastructure problems. We've got
10 education problems. I don't think that the United States
11 can afford to continue to invest in campaigns like Iraq
12 and Afghanistan as we have over this past decade. So no,
13 I think that transition has a reasonable possibility of
14 success, but we've reached a point now in terms of our own
15 means that are available and I think frankly in terms of
16 the Afghans that it is time for this transition to take
17 place.

18 I'm reading right now Ron Chernow's *Washington:*
19 *A Life*, and I -- came across as he's talking about now
20 dealing with the French -- the American revolutionaries
21 dealing with the French, Washington saying that if we're
22 going to win our liberty, we, the American

1 revolutionaries, our army, has to be the one to win the
2 battles.

3 We need the French, but it's ours to win, and
4 so, yeah, I think that we've reached a point where we've
5 done a lot. There's a good foundation. We're going to
6 continue to do more, but it's over to the Afghans at this
7 point.

8 GEN. LUTE: Steve, if I may just add a thought.

9 MR. KROFT: Yes.

10 GEN. LUTE: If you ask Americans in the wake of
11 9/11 what price would you be willing to pay to buy a decade
12 without a recurrence? And remember those days, I mean,
13 you all have your personal ones. I have my personal
14 memories. Everyone here has personal memories of what
15 happened in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Who would
16 have bought 10 years of safety without a major, another
17 repeat, this -- another significant attack from al-Qaida?

18 Who would have paid 10 years ago for the
19 dismantlement, the disruption that we see that largely
20 this conference codifies and has acknowledged over the
21 last day and a half of al-Qaida as a movement? So not
22 only have we been safe and those significant losses in

1 terms of treasure and lives and so forth, but they haven't
2 -- it hasn't been -- it hasn't gone without value.

3 I mean we have been safe for 10 years. We've
4 really gotten after al-Qaida. They're on the edge of
5 defeat, and quite frankly, as a 10-year investment, as at
6 least one American here that sounds like a pretty
7 reasonable price to pay.

8 MR. KROFT: Do you think it's been worth the
9 investment?

10 GEN. LUTE: I think it has --

11 MR. KROFT: Do you think it's been worth all the
12 blood and all the treasure?

13 GEN. LUTE: Well, look. No, I'm never going to
14 say that because any individual life there -- I mean,
15 there's probably someone in this audience who lost a loved
16 one and for that individual, for that family, it's never
17 going to be worth it, okay. But I'm talking -- the
18 question had to do with America as a nation.

19 And America as a nation bought 10 years of
20 security from al-Qaida and has bought ourselves within
21 sight of defeating the movement, the core of the movement
22 in Pakistan and in the Afghan-Pakistan border region. And

1 to me, never negating or never trying to belittle the
2 individual losses that got us there, it seems to me that
3 that's a national price worth paying.

4 AMB. HAKIMI: Well --

5 MR. KROFT: Doug?

6 AMB. HAKIMI: If I may? Sure.

7 MR. KROFT: Go ahead.

8 AMB. HAKIMI: Go ahead.

9 MR. KROFT: Go ahead. Do you agree also it was
10 worth it?

11 GEN. EIKENBERRY: I agree. But the way that
12 Doug framed it, again, Steve, if historians and
13 strategists look back over the last 10 years in Iraq and
14 Afghanistan, will they conclude that we needed to spend as
15 much treasure as we did, as many lives, you know, it's
16 hard when you're in the midst of a campaign, when you're
17 at war to try to think through all the uncertainties and
18 come up with the optimal strategy.

19 However, having said that, I do think that the
20 United States must conduct a good review of the wars that
21 we've fought. You know, just several brief points about
22 this. You know, for instance, the starting point of our

1 counterinsurgency strategy, a good first principle stated
2 we're there to protect the populations, we accept that.

3 But what does that really mean, protect the
4 population? Against insurgents? Yes. Against drug
5 cartels? I'm not sure. Against the tribe that's on the
6 other side of the hill that's been at war with the tribe
7 that we're aligned with for the last 500 years? So these
8 are the kind of questions that we develop a doctrine and
9 without questioning that doctrine then we start to accept
10 that as a strategy.

11 And there's one other point that I think needs
12 to be examined in these wars that we've fought. We've had
13 a contract in the United States over the years between --
14 an unspoken contract between the civilian leadership and
15 the military leadership of our country. It's Sam
16 Huntington's objective military control. Over the last
17 decade, our military has started to get in more and more
18 areas that go far from the Huntington model of the
19 militaries there to manage violence, and we give them
20 autonomy and oversight in that domain.

21 My concern is over the last decade and the wars
22 that we fought, our military has gotten into development,

1 government, anticorruption and on it goes. And then as
2 that starts to erode from the most specific definition of
3 what a professional officer corps does, manage violence, I
4 think accountability begins to suffer in the military
5 ranks as well.

6 AMB. HAKIMI: Well, I think that's about time to
7 remind to American public why U.S. engaged in Afghanistan
8 in the first place after September 11, and that was
9 because the U.S. security receives threat from that part
10 of the world. And terrorist groups, they use that soil
11 against U.S. and 3,000 innocent Americans here in New
12 York, they lost their life. Because of that, all these
13 treasure, all the blood invested there.

14 And also in Soviet invasion, when Afghans paid
15 the price, 1 million Afghan died and 1.5 million disabled
16 and we defeated Soviet Union, at that time also
17 Afghanistan abandoned. And again 10 years after, U.S.
18 reengaged. So I think we should be honest to say that the
19 security of Afghanistan, how it link the security in the
20 region and also here, security in the U.S.

21 MR. KROFT: General Lute, you made a reference
22 earlier to Pakistan --

1 AMB. REHMAN: Can I come in?

2 MR. KROFT: Yeah -- no. I have a special
3 question for you, Sherry. You made the statement --

4 AMB. REHMAN: Yeah.

5 MR. KROFT: -- Doug, that without the
6 cooperation of Pakistan, this was going to be extremely
7 difficult to do.

8 Now for Ambassador Rehman, there was a
9 protracted period of time when the United States and
10 Pakistan were allies. That seems to have ended, friends
11 and allies. That seems to have ended. Sixty -- I don't
12 know, I think three out of four people in Pakistan right
13 now according to a Pew public opinion poll consider the
14 United States an enemy of Pakistan and millions of
15 American people are asking the question, is Pakistan
16 friend or foe? What's the answer to that question?

17 AMB. REHMAN: Very quickly, Steve, we've -- I
18 think Pakistan and the United States have been through an
19 extraordinarily difficult time over the last 7 months.
20 You know that the NATO supply lines that ran through
21 Pakistan for 12 years were suspended. It was suspended
22 not in a fit of pique; they were suspended because we had

1 24 soldiers killed at the border by NATO and ISAF forces.
2 Those were unlocked when an apology freed up both sides to
3 take the arc of this relationship to prevent it from
4 spiraling down.

5 Yes, you have talked about the Pew polls, et
6 cetera, but I think there is still a very strong will and
7 commitment on both sides. And I can certainly speak for
8 Pakistan that we see very little value in not rebuilding
9 our ties with the United States, and of course with
10 Afghanistan. We are, as I said, intensifying our
11 engagement with all our neighbors on both sides and the
12 United States has been an ally and a friend through many
13 phases of our history and relationship.

14 I sympathize with Ambassador Hakimi who says
15 that, you know, Afghanistan was abandoned. There is a
16 baggage to this issue. There is a problem and Pakistan is
17 very clearly -- I mean, we were at Chicago. We were at
18 the summit to unequivocally declare our support to the
19 project and to say that well, we talked Afghan stability
20 and security to say that, you know, we don't want a repeat
21 of the '90s. We don't want another security vacuum again.
22 We don't want Afghanistan to slide into civil war.

1 We have the -- a very high stake in Afghan
2 security. It would surge -- insecurity would surge right
3 into Pakistan, and as it is, we stand transformed over the
4 last 30 years. And in 12 years when you say well, you
5 know, al-Qaida, the core of al-Qaida has been defeated,
6 it's been defeated with Pakistan's active and constant,
7 not just attention, but cooperation in the field.

8 We have, I think, captured and brought to
9 justice or certainly handed over to the Americans over 250
10 high-value targets, al-Qaida. We now are looking at a
11 degraded core and we hope to be able to defeat them with
12 American cooperation, but without impossible demands such
13 as well, you know, you've got to do more -- everybody has
14 been citing losses and they're very tragic. We empathize
15 and sympathize.

16 But where's the strategic sympathy for Pakistan
17 having lost 42,000 lives in these last 12 years since
18 we've committed ourselves to this war? You know, this is
19 not a grievance narrative I want to bring to this. We
20 want to engage in a constructive and very concrete
21 conversation where we can take both our gains forward and
22 prepare for a time where the American presence is --

1 obviously has gone down, but as we're told that there will
2 be some American security presence in Afghanistan, but we
3 hope that once again I say that the capacity and
4 capability of the Afghan National Security Forces and
5 their policing mechanism remain of the quality and caliber
6 that can take on.

7 What we hear -- for instance, we hear these
8 days, an 11 percent uptick in violence in Afghanistan,
9 insurgent violence and this adds to Pakistan's anxieties
10 and it really is an important spur for us to cooperate,
11 but we do look to the United States to not make what I
12 call an irresponsible exit, and I hope that is the way we
13 will look at it in the future.

14 GEN. LUTE: Steve, let me just comment. And
15 first of all, underlying what Ambassador Rehman just said
16 about a common interest between our two countries,
17 Pakistan and the United States, and that's the ultimate
18 achievement of this core goal, to defeat al-Qaida. There
19 -- as she rightly says, there have been more al-Qaida
20 leaders and operatives captured and killed in Pakistan
21 than anywhere else in the world.

22 The other core interest though, common interest

1 that she highlights is the stability in Afghanistan.
2 There's no stability in Afghanistan that doesn't involve
3 Pakistan and there's no stability in Pakistan that doesn't
4 involve Afghanistan. So we have a common interest to get
5 this right on both sides of the Durand Line.

6 MR. KROFT: Secretary of Defense Panetta
7 indicated that he has no intention or sees no reason to
8 end the strikes, the drone strikes across the border. And
9 a question for you, General Eikenberry, there is a doctor,
10 a Pakistani doctor in prison right now sentenced to 33
11 years in prison for treason, for assisting Americans in
12 the search for Osama bin Laden.

13 What does that say about our relationship with
14 Pakistan where it would seem that they have more loyalty
15 to Osama bin Laden than they do to the United States? I
16 mean you're talking about an international fugitive wanted
17 all over the world and someone goes to jail and prison for
18 treason for trying to turn him in.

19 GEN. EIKENBERRY: Yeah. Steve, I'd defer to the
20 ambassador on that, but in a word I'd call it outrageous.

21 MR. KROFT: Can you explain that decision? And
22 I think this is one of the problems with the relationship

1 right now, Ambassador, is that Americans look at that
2 decision. And they say, what's going on inside the
3 Pakistani government. What's going on inside the courts?
4 They clearly seem to hate us.

5 AMB. REHMAN: I -- if I may interject here, I
6 don't think there's any question of hatred. That's a very
7 strong emotion, and Pakistanis are right now in a place
8 where they are looking or we are looking towards our first
9 democratic transition, civilian peaceful democratic
10 transition and our institutions are strong. There is a
11 rule of law model that our courts are working with.

12 We have recently lost a prime minister to the
13 actions of -- in the Supreme Court in Pakistan. We are
14 working according to a constitutional norm. And now when
15 you talk about Afridi, let me just say very clearly, Dr.
16 Afridi had no idea he was looking for Osama bin Laden. So
17 before you valorize his actions, do understand that for
18 Pakistan, on the ground, he was contracting with a foreign
19 intelligence agency without anybody's permission there.

20 He was contracting with militant groups that are
21 beheading our soldiers or attempting to do so. He was
22 contracting with many people on the ground and he had no

1 clue that he was engaged in this historic fight against or
2 looking for -- search for Osama bin Laden, and I'd also
3 like to point out that if you remember President Obama's
4 first speech when Osama bin Laden was found, he very
5 clearly mentioned Pakistan's cooperation in the effort
6 leading up to Osama bin Laden's, you know, eventual
7 killing and search.

8 So I think that there is no question -- I mean
9 it really pains me to hear that Pakistan is being put in a
10 category of a country that is harboring or is looking to
11 preserve Osama bin Laden, to sanctuary Osama bin Laden. I
12 mean people like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, all other high-
13 value targets were found with Pakistan's active
14 cooperation. Now that is not the profile of a country
15 that is looking to valorize Osama bin Laden.

16 He -- we were all excited when Osama bin Laden
17 was found, but then we discovered that it was without our
18 active participation. It certainly was with our
19 assistance at some level and that unfortunate incident did
20 inflame passions because it represented a strike into
21 Pakistan which we would have certainly cooperated. We
22 would have said fine, share the actionable intelligence

1 with us and we would go after him.

2 We do not need to valorize people like Dr.
3 Afridi and I can't really say what can or what should be
4 done with him. He is facing the courts. He faces -- I
5 mean, he has access to justice. He will appeal his
6 sentence if he may, and that is really a choice he's got
7 to make. But to tell us that, oh, you know, we can't put
8 -- send to courts a doctor who has put into jeopardy
9 thousands of our children who are now facing a loss of,
10 you know, critical polio vaccines and other aid workers
11 who are now lumped in that spy category.

12 What Dr. Afridi has done is he has lumped a
13 great deal of our workers on the ground. He's put them in
14 danger, our health workers, our primary vaccinators as
15 well as WHO officials. He's endangered people's lives.
16 We are not a country that is looking to be polio-endemic,
17 and this is one of the charges that, I think, holds up
18 against Dr. Afridi.

19 It is not about who assisted the United States
20 to find Osama bin Laden. We have been assisting the
21 United States to find Osama bin Laden. And I have to say
22 with due respect that that's -- it's quite outrageous to

1 say that Pakistan has been harboring people who would act
2 against the United States, that Pakistan has been, after
3 all the sacrifice and blood and treasure, \$78 billion of
4 Pakistan spend in 12 years --

5 MR. KROFT: I think General Eikenberry has
6 something to say, or Ambassador Eikenberry, I'm sorry.

7 GEN. EIKENBERRY: Another good thing about
8 leaving government military service is you get your first
9 name back.

10 (Laughter)

11 MR. KROFT: Karl.

12 GEN. EIKENBERRY: So Karl is very good. Just
13 three quick points, and not to disagree with the Pakistani
14 ambassador. Point number one, look, the U.S. approval
15 rate, U.S. popularity, favorability ratings in Pakistan
16 are about 7 percent right now. That's even lower than
17 U.S. population favorability ratings for our Congress. So
18 that is very, very low.

19 (Laughter)

20 GEN. EIKENBERRY: And it's not entirely due to
21 Pakistan obviously that those ratings are like that.
22 Second point is I think for the United States, we're

1 simply, over the last 10 years, we simply aren't clear
2 what Pakistan's interests are. I'm not sure that the
3 Pakistanis are absolutely clear or unified in this.

4 On the one hand, if you're Pakistan and you're
5 part of the national security apparatus and you're looking
6 at the potential for a very weak Afghanistan, then staying
7 aligned with the Afghan Taliban makes good sense. It's a
8 good hedge because Afghanistan, if it were to collapse,
9 it's going to once again become the playground of great
10 games.

11 And so there's an argument that they'd want to
12 hedge. On the other hand you could have a view that the
13 Pakistanis assume that Afghanistan is going to succeed
14 brilliantly and be well aligned with the United States and
15 perhaps India in which case you might want to hedge with
16 the Taliban as well. It's simply their calculus remains
17 very opaque to us.

18 And then the third point, I think what
19 Ambassador Rehman said about the transition now, this
20 first hopefully successful civilian transition, that's
21 critical. For the United States and our long term
22 relationship with Pakistan, stepping back, we always will

1 come to the conclusion Pakistan needs to get a strong
2 civilian accountable government that controls its
3 military.

4 But the nature of the relationship with Pakistan
5 has been one in which the urgent has always trumped what
6 we know to be the long term strategic important. And the
7 urgent is most recently -- was the war on terror. And so
8 then compromises deal directly with the Pakistani
9 military, deal directly with the Pakistani ISI and, of
10 course, that makes sense for the United States of America,
11 as Doug had talked about, with the consequences of 9/11.
12 But I'm not sure that that is a strategy which 20 years
13 from now is going to make us any better off.

14 MR. KROFT: I have one more question. The
15 United States has been very critical and the press has
16 been very critical of Pakistan, and particularly for
17 giving sanctuary on the border. You both, you've all, I'm
18 guessing, all of you have been to that border region as I
19 have been. It is a very, very difficult place to defend,
20 a place politically where the Pakistani government has
21 almost no power and very little influence.

22 Is it fair to blame the government of Pakistan

1 for making that area available when in fact they don't
2 control it and they have sent troops in there a number of
3 different times and sustained very heavy casualties. Is -
4 - I guess what I'm saying, is Pakistan been unfairly
5 attacked for the border issue?

6 GEN. LUTE: You know, Steve, the way we look at
7 this is that sovereignty has privileges but comes with
8 responsibilities, and that's true on both sides of that
9 border. You can't control that border or as far as I can
10 tell any other border, international border, from one side
11 alone. This has to be an effort on both sides of the
12 border. We've been quite deliberate with our support to
13 the Afghan government to do so on its side of the border.
14 We believe it's Pakistan's sovereign responsibility to do
15 on its side of the border.

16 Now, even if because of perhaps a hedging
17 approach, which may be outdated now, but even if they
18 could make the case that it's in Pakistan's interest or
19 was in Pakistan's interest at one time to support the
20 Afghan Taliban by way of permitting them sanctuary and so
21 forth, I'd argue that today the Pashtun militancy, the
22 Pakistani Taliban, presents such a significant threat to

1 Pakistan itself, to the state of Pakistan itself, that
2 whatever that hedging strategy might have meant some time
3 ago no longer makes any sense because there's no way, in
4 our view, to discriminate effectively between the Afghan
5 Taliban in those border regions and the Pakistani Taliban
6 who threaten the Pakistani state itself. So it may be a
7 hedging approach, but if so then it's a hedging approach
8 that is out of date.

9 MR. KROFT: Ambassador, what do you think?

10 AMB. HAKIMI: Well, this is something that we
11 have been arguing for quite some time, that from the safe
12 haven on the other side of the Durand Line, our opposition
13 forces, they receive financial support, they receive
14 equipment and also they receive training. Initially,
15 nobody wanted to admit this. Now, everybody agree. Our
16 partners, initially they didn't want to acknowledge, but
17 now everybody is pointing the finger that that's the area
18 we should deal with. This is a fact. You cannot ignore
19 that.

20 MR. KROFT: And this aid is being channeled
21 through the ISI and the intelligence agencies right now?

22 AMB. HAKIMI: Well, Chairman Mullen, he clearly

1 mentioned, of course, in the last days in his office, that
2 Haqqani Network is an inevitable arm of ISI. We have been
3 receiving promises from our Pakistani friends that they
4 will do something and we are hopeful that there are some
5 practical steps toward that and it's not that difficult to
6 say that Taliban are not welcome to use Pakistani soil
7 against Afghanistan publicly and do something practically
8 to stop that which is not happening. There are a lot of
9 promises, but it's better to be under-promised and over-
10 delivered.

11 GEN. LUTE: You know, Steve, this --

12 AMB. REHMAN: May I just? Excuse me. May I
13 just add voice to what Ambassador Hakimi is saying?
14 Pakistan has very clearly and unequivocally said that we
15 would be very happy to assist Afghanistan -- Afghan forces
16 and NATO-ISAF forces, but we have not seen any serious
17 interdictions on that border. For instance, if I may say,
18 that we have a question of sanctuary of the Haqqani
19 Network.

20 We are also not clear about what U.S. policy
21 over the last few years, where it's going. There is
22 opacity there too. We are asked to assist in the

1 reconciliation or rather the peace talks that are going on
2 and we certainly are assisting at every level with the
3 High Peace commission and other conversations, but we --
4 at the heart of this, and you mentioned this, Steve, at
5 the heart of this assumption here is that 49 nations with
6 their \$400 billion have not been able to accomplish X goal
7 in Afghanistan and somehow Pakistan should manage that
8 with its 150,000 troops committed to the border.

9 And when we talk to the American military here,
10 we get some level of strategic sympathy because they are
11 very clear that as everybody says, Pakistan is maxed out
12 on the international border with Afghanistan, and for
13 instance, we have given -- when we run border operations,
14 our military runs extensive anti-terrorist operations.

15 I'll give you two examples, Bajaur and Malakand.
16 We displaced hundreds and thousands of refugees in our own
17 country, hosting them, shifting them out of huge swades
18 (phonetic) of area, and what do we get? We get the
19 terrorists that we have smoked out, not being anviled on
20 the other side, and we are now only able -- and so at the
21 heart of this whole argument is a flawed assumption that
22 Pakistan's capacity is limitless.

1 Of course, to us this war is -- our commitment
2 to fighting terrorism is open-ended, our militaries and
3 our own as well as the civilian governments so the United
4 States can walk away, others can walk away to some extent.
5 We can't walk away from it. We will have to face all the
6 -- we are in the trenches, on the front lines.

7 And I'll give you an example. This -- over the
8 last eight months when we have incurred constant firing
9 and attacks, and these are critical masses of people that
10 come in. This is not just potshots. This is not people
11 going across the border, coming back. We have informed
12 U.S. and NATO forces at least 52 times formally on
13 longitude and latitude of where are the terrorists that
14 run from our area.

15 So what is the -- we need hammer and anvil if
16 we're going to operate on that border to some effect and
17 manage to interdict those that we need to interdict. So
18 we shouldn't be getting this constant message that
19 Pakistan has just got to do everything on its side of the
20 border. We clean out people. They go sit there in
21 sanctuary in Nuristan and Kunar.

22 We don't say that it's active sanctuary. We

1 assume it's a capacity problem. We assume it's a
2 sequencing issue. So we would assume at least that amount
3 of strategic sympathy be given to Pakistan, and that's
4 really why you see ratings slip because you see this
5 American ratings, if you see this public messaging, which
6 is constantly assuming that Pakistan should mop up where
7 everybody else leaves off.

8 We can't do this alone. We need -- that's why
9 we need a partnership. That's why we need to focus on
10 goals that are concrete and deliverable. That's why we
11 need our militaries to act in complement to each other,
12 not in areas where we're -- if we're operating in the
13 south, then it would be a good idea if they operate in the
14 south. If we've shut off our communication towers in all
15 the Waziristan areas, it's a good idea if the Afghan side
16 also does that.

17 One of the ways to triangulate terrorists is
18 through their conversations. And I'm sure that all these
19 tasks can be achieved. We have, what, over -- about
20 nearly a 1,000 border check posts on our side of the
21 border, but we are offered about one-tenth of that on the
22 NATO ISAF side. So here is a question of what is a

1 priority. We've had drone attacks, over 250, in the North
2 Waziristan area. So if Haqqani is sitting there and we
3 are unable to take them on or smoke them out, then what
4 did those attacks do? So I --

5 MR. KROFT: Ambassador, we have just -- we want
6 to turn this over to the audience for questions and I have
7 a couple of more areas, couple of more questions I want to
8 raise. You want to --

9 GEN. LUTE: I have to just reply to Ambassador
10 Rehman though. There's no comparison of the Pakistani
11 Taliban, relatively recent, small-in-scale presence inside
12 Afghanistan, and in particular in these two remote
13 provinces, Kunar and Nuristan, to the decades long
14 experience and relationship between elements of the
15 Pakistani government and the Afghan Taliban. So to
16 compare these is simply, I think, unfair.

17 GEN. EIKENBERRY: Steve, if I could also
18 interject.

19 MR. KROFT: Go ahead.

20 GEN. EIKENBERRY: You led with how difficult the
21 terrain is, and I think Ambassador, you, you Steve, and
22 Doug and I and probably Ambassador Rehman has all been up

1 there. And look, it's like telling a bunch of young
2 captains or majors that are going to fight up there, you
3 know, welcome to these outpost on the moon and now defend
4 this. It is extraordinarily difficult terrain. We
5 understand that.

6 But against that, my second point is that let's
7 take the Haqqani headquarters in Miram Shah. In Miram
8 Shah, about a kilometer away from the Haqqani's main
9 activity is the headquarters of the Ninth Infantry
10 Division of the Pakistani army. Pakistan has suffered
11 great losses in the war on terror. I do not dispute that.
12 And that due credit needs to be given.

13 But I have to say from my perspective a very
14 good start for Pakistan, unambiguous would be say we're
15 not going to go in and fight because it will be a very
16 tough fight, but what we will do, we'll call in the Afghan
17 Taliban leadership and we will tell them you have several
18 choices to make right now. You can stop fighting and
19 begin peace negotiations. You cannot fight from our soil.
20 You can put down your weapons and we can see if we can
21 integrate you into Pakistan, or number three, you can go
22 into Afghanistan and continue to fight, but not from our

1 soil.

2 AMB. REHMAN: We are very happy to do that and I
3 welcome that suggestion. This is certainly the position
4 of the Pakistan government today. We don't welcome a
5 sanctuary for foreign fighters on our soil. They
6 challenge writ of our state as much as they challenge
7 lives in Afghanistan and that is very clear. There is no
8 question right now of hedging bets. We are not betting on
9 anyone clear.

10 We are very careful now that even when we have
11 high level visits, the entire focus is not one group. We
12 make sure that the prime minister or the foreign minister
13 meet with everybody. We make sure that we are engaged
14 with the Afghan government, and Kabul is in constant
15 conversation with us now in terms of how to move forward.

16 And I would like to point this group forward
17 towards moving from a security transition to talk of peace
18 because there needs to be less of a mixed signal. We are
19 told that, look, you know, please if you can bring so and
20 so to talk to the table, including the Haqqani Network.
21 Now, this assumes that we can always bring everybody to
22 the table. I'm not sure that we can.

1 This also assumes that we have a high stake in
2 Afghan peace and a model which is inclusive and that
3 brings Afghanistan into the future as a modern developing
4 emerging democracy, yes, we have a stake in that. And we
5 are very clear that that is the model we would like to
6 invest in and be partners of. But we are not making
7 Afghanistan our strategic backyard, so there is no betting
8 on the Taliban.

9 The Taliban challenge us as much as they
10 challenge Afghanistan, and if there are those that seek to
11 reconcile then they must do so according to the
12 constitution of Pakistan. There are certain areas, our
13 tribal areas, which as you say are not easy to govern.
14 They couldn't be governed by many before us or before
15 Pakistan became Pakistan.

16 We are seeking to enhance our writ. It has to
17 be incremental, and we can't be asked to bomb people all
18 on our own while others hang back. So I think it's a
19 question of priorities being developed on both sides and
20 this would be a constructive time to do so now that our
21 NATO supplies are open, now that there is will on both
22 sides to begin a new road towards building equities for

1 peace in the region. And that includes India as well as
2 Pakistan. We are making great strides in terms of opening
3 up our trade and other conversations for peace with India.
4 So this is a new Pakistan. Catch up, gentlemen.

5 MR. KROFT: I want to --

6 (Laughter)

7 MR. KROFT: I want to ask what are the realistic
8 chances of some sort of meaningful negotiations between
9 the Taliban and whoever, Afghanistan, the United States,
10 Pakistan, some combination of those, to bring about some
11 sort of a political resolution or a ceasefire, some sorts
12 of -- some sort of outcome that might end this for the
13 Afghan people? What do you think? We'll start with you,
14 Ambassador.

15 AMB. HAKIMI: Peace process has two tiers. One
16 is reintegration and one is the reconciliation. In the
17 reintegration front we have achieved a lot; a
18 reintegration designed to bring the foot soldiers within
19 the system. With that in mind, those that they renounce
20 violence, they cut tie with al-Qaida and they accept
21 Afghan constitution, they are more than welcome to
22 reintegrate.

1 So more than 4,000 Taliban foot soldiers already
2 joined this program and they enjoy the facilities that we
3 have provided. On the reconciliation front however, there
4 are a lot of talks, there are a lot of discussions, but
5 this is a process. If you assume to achieve something
6 overnight, it's not going to happen.

7 We have opened different channel of
8 communications with them. Most recently in Kyoto, in
9 Doshisha University, Taliban represented for the first
10 time in one room was engaging with High Peace Council from
11 our government. It was not a negotiation, but at least
12 exchange of views, that everybody made their points clear.

13 So we think that with the support of again our
14 Pakistani friends there, they have been saying that they
15 are supporting Afghan-led Afghan peace process, which we
16 appreciate, and we are willing to see some practical steps
17 that they have something in stake and they can play a
18 crucial role. So it's something that's going on and this
19 is one of the top priorities in our government's program
20 to succeed that.

21 And within Taliban also there are moderators
22 that they want to join and there are some that they still

1 insist on the military operations. So there are signs
2 that make us believe that things that we have initiated
3 that will bring some fruitful result at the end.

4 MR. KROFT: Doug, I'm interested in what you
5 think on this but first answer for me the question why
6 would the Taliban want to enter into negotiations at a
7 time when the United States is scaling back and
8 withdrawing its troops, and by the end of 2014 will be
9 down to no combat troops, why wouldn't they want to take a
10 chance and see how good the Afghan army is before they
11 start thinking about some kind of a --

12 GEN. LUTE: Right. Well, see, they may want to
13 take a chance. But what we've made clear, what President
14 Obama has made clear is that the door is open to another
15 possibility and that is a negotiated political process
16 that could leave for the Afghan-Taliban, especially the
17 leadership who are outside Afghanistan itself and not
18 subject to the pressure of the military campaign, leave
19 open for them a door back into the political process in
20 Afghanistan.

21 Now, that's not -- it's not free. They've got
22 to meet three end conditions. They've got to break ties

1 with al-Qaida, they've got to stop the insurgency, stop
2 the fighting, and when they come back to Afghanistan,
3 they've got to do so inside the framework of the Afghan
4 constitution. So there's some end conditions to this
5 notion of reconciliation or the top down process.

6 Why would they think about doing this? First of
7 all, their movements are being hammered every day and
8 every night by not only 100,000 NATO led ISAF troops, but
9 now approaching 350,000 Afghan forces. So they are under
10 extreme military pressure. In fact, this is one of the
11 design features of the military campaign, to put
12 sufficient military pressure on the movement so that the
13 door that President Obama has opened to political process
14 looks attractive.

15 Another reason they might have to is that
16 increasingly as we transition from our being in the lead
17 to the Afghan forces being in the lead, the Taliban
18 narrative of counter occupation or the Taliban narrative
19 of jihad against the West begins to erode because now
20 increasingly they are fighting Afghan forces, fellow
21 Afghans, not American forces.

22 And then finally, we believe that by way of our

1 partnership with Afghanistan, which Ambassador Hakimi
2 outlined, and by the way not only with the U.S. but about
3 eight other countries in the NATO alliance as a whole,
4 signals to the Taliban that they can't wait us out. So if
5 they like the current situation, living in some sort of
6 safe haven although probably as second class citizens in
7 Pakistan, and if they want to continue another decade of
8 this and if they want their force to continue to be
9 hammered every day and every night increasingly by
10 Afghans, then the door would remain open until they see
11 otherwise.

12 GEN. EIKENBERRY: And Steve, if we go back to
13 how we opened talking about progress that has been made,
14 if you go to the urban areas, the big urban areas of
15 Afghanistan, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad, things have
16 transformed since 2001, a lot of young people there that
17 have a very different world view. I think for the Taliban
18 to believe that they could claim all of that back again
19 and impose their order, that's a stretch.

20 Does that mean that as we go forward with
21 transition, there will be problems -- there won't be
22 problems with insecurity and bad governance in those urban

1 areas? No, it does not. But here I'm talking about
2 Taliban. So then three points going forward with talks
3 with the Taliban and the importance of them and what can
4 be achieved.

5 Number one, to agree with what Doug had laid
6 out, and that is that very importantly if we get this
7 transitioned right, then Taliban's narrative is
8 evaporating every day as the Afghans move to the lead.
9 Number two, it does make the point then, it drives home
10 the point, that we've really got to get this enduring or
11 the longer term presence right because that longer term
12 presence that we have after 2014, security assistance,
13 maybe counterterrorism, what does that add up to along
14 with amount of developmental assistance, reassurance to
15 the Afghans, which gives them the political confidence for
16 dialogue also the right incentives to the Taliban that we
17 are not leaving and perhaps the right incentives to
18 Pakistan.

19 And then the third and final point though is as
20 we talk about a political settlement, I think we sometimes
21 overstate this as a question of Taliban versus all the
22 rest, Taliban versus the rest of the Afghan body politic.

1 My own view is that Afghanistan writ large going back to
2 the troubled times of the mid 1970s, the Afghan body
3 politic need reconciliation among themselves.

4 And I increasingly look at the Taliban dialogue
5 perhaps as a subset of a larger dialogue that has to take
6 place. Remember, let's be clear, the Taliban when it
7 advanced in the mid-1990s to take control of a lot of
8 parts of Afghanistan in their initial fighting, they were
9 welcome as liberators, liberation from the rapine of some
10 very vicious warlords whose depredations had opened the
11 door to Taliban.

12 Now, Taliban have great misrule themselves.
13 Let's also be clear that some of those warlords whose
14 depredations led to the rise of the Taliban occupy
15 positions of formal and informal power in Afghanistan
16 today. So the problem goes beyond just the Taliban.

17 MR. KROFT: One last question; then we've got to
18 go to the questions from the floor. There has been --
19 there are people that believe this whole situation could
20 fall back into civil war. That after the United States
21 leaves and the stability that it has provided there in
22 terms of security anyway, that you run the risk of these

1 warlords and tribal groups that have been at each other's
2 throats for -- in some cases for centuries, are going to
3 reemerge and people are going to leave the Taliban and end
4 up -- and everything is just going to go back to the way
5 it was. Is that a real concern?

6 AMB. HAKIMI: Well, first of all, if I may --

7 MR. KROFT: And try and keep this short.

8 AMB. HAKIMI: In Afghanistan, before Soviet
9 invasion, we lived with each other peacefully. And
10 Afghanistan before invasion, if you see the history there,
11 we had a constitution, a moderate society, rule of law, a
12 proper justice system and Afghanistan active member of
13 international community. And this perception that
14 Afghanistan was -- within Afghanistan tribes fighting with
15 each other, I think that's not right.

16 When Soviet invasion happened, from that point
17 on until the civil war and so on, for the last 30 years or
18 so, we -- fighting imposed on us. Before that, we were a
19 peaceful society. We lived side by side for years. And
20 from now on also this is something that we believe, we, I
21 mean, Afghan people, that we don't want to go back to
22 those dark days and we are looking for a bright future.

1 And if I may, one point I want to make about
2 corruption, that most recently we had a very successful
3 conference in Tokyo, an international conference that more
4 than 70 countries came and they pledged to support
5 Afghanistan for the next 40 years for \$16 billion, and
6 there we agreed about mutual accountability, that we do
7 certain things while our international partners will do
8 certain things.

9 And most recently like 2, 3 days ago, our
10 president already issued a decree with 23 very ambitious
11 measures to fight corruption drastically across the line
12 in judicial system, our line ministries and all others to
13 the point that we should give that satisfaction to our
14 partners and also to our own people.

15 MR. KROFT: From the former U.S. military
16 people, do you think that's a realistic scenario, the
17 civil war?

18 GEN. EIKENBERRY: Several points I'd make. The
19 first is, and I agree with Ambassador Hakimi, the Afghans
20 are tired of war and they have many adults who in their
21 life time have seen the tragedy of civil war in Taliban
22 occupation. Secondly, there's no neighbors of Afghanistan

1 that are pulling at any of the domestic groups, the ethnic
2 groups of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is blessed in that
3 way, a fractious set of ethnic groups, but with a
4 surprising sense of nationalism underlying it.

5 And then third, quick vignette if I could,
6 Steve, in 2006, I went to the Town of Gardez, where the
7 two of first Afghan National Army headquarters was
8 located. I went there with the then National Security
9 Advisor Steve Hadley, and we visited a Major General Rufi
10 (phonetic) in command. Steve asked a question through an
11 interpreter; General Rufi, what are you most proud of?
12 And he said, I'm most proud of the staff officers in the
13 room, that personnel officers at Hazara, that intelligence
14 officers at Tajik, that operations officers in Uzbek, and
15 we were fighting each other, about 10 years ago.

16 Steve asked the question then, well, what do you
17 worry about the most? He said I worry you Americans will
18 leave before it's time. I've been in Afghanistan a lot at
19 that point, many years, and I thought Rufi was saying
20 before we've gotten all the equipment to them, before all
21 the barracks are built, I was wrong.

22 Rufi explained it and said, I'll go back to what

1 I'm most proud of is that we are not ready yet to work
2 together. We don't have the level of trust and
3 confidence. We need you here for a longer period of time
4 for us to achieve that. My view is you don't need a
5 100,000 United States troops in order to achieve that.
6 You can be clever. And I think that the Afghans do want
7 us to have a much smaller footprint in their country than
8 we do today.

9 GEN. LUTE: Steve, I'd only add that given the
10 level of development of Afghan's -- of the Afghan
11 political structure, civil war might be a risk if we
12 didn't have a deliberate transition process over the next
13 30 months. And if we didn't, even beyond that transition
14 process, plan today for a sustained U.S. supportive role
15 alongside the NATO alliance, and today some 50 other
16 countries who have said essentially we are not going to
17 replay 1989. So 2014 is not a 25-year break from 1989,
18 and we're just going to repeat the tragic history when the
19 Russians left.

20 MR. KROFT: Okay, we want to take some questions
21 from the floor. We have people with microphones. You --
22 let's start here in the middle.

1 MR. PLACIDO: Good afternoon, Tony Placido,
2 formerly with DEA. A question for General Eikenberry.
3 General, if I understood you correctly, you at least
4 questioned the utility of engaging the narcotics
5 traffickers or the drug trade in Afghanistan. My question
6 is, is it really feasible to consolidate the gains that we
7 have made with such blood and treasure without dealing
8 with the narcotics trade, which fuels the insurgency,
9 promotes corruption of public officials and institutions,
10 undermines public confidence and generally challenges rule
11 of law?

12 GEN. EIKENBERRY: Yeah, Tony, I didn't -- and
13 thanks for raising that point. I certainly didn't mean to
14 communicate that the war against drugs in Afghanistan is
15 not vital for Afghanistan's success and stability and an
16 important national interest of our own. I was talking
17 about the loose definition of a military doctrine. But the
18 approaches that DEA has had in countries like Columbia and
19 has in Afghanistan, they must be continued. They must
20 absolutely be continued.

21 Still Afghanistan produces 90 percent of the
22 world's poppy. We think of every say \$10 of corruption

1 that exist with those poppy dollars or Afghani inside of
2 Afghanistan, \$7 of them are going to the police of
3 Afghanistan, to the government of Afghanistan, to informal
4 power brokers, \$3 of those are going to the Taliban. So
5 this is a very serious problem, that because of the
6 existence of the drug trafficking and its perversion of
7 the economy and politics, I don't know how you can
8 eventually stabilize Afghanistan unless you continue those
9 efforts.

10 MR. KROFT: Well, over here.

11 MR. GENEST: Mark Genest of the Naval War
12 College. I have a question regarding the lessons learned
13 from Afghanistan. We chose a strategy in the last 4 or 5
14 years in Afghanistan, the heavy footprint coin with lots
15 of troops, over a 100,000 troops, and national building
16 strategy. Looking back at it, would it have been wiser
17 had we diminished the role of heavy footprint using small
18 footprint strategy and not promising nation building
19 because it looks like we over-promised and under-
20 delivered?

21 GEN. LUTE: Well, let me take a stab at that. I
22 mean, the two lessons that I carry around in my notebook,

1 which are overwhelming for me, having been somewhat
2 involved with Afghanistan since 2004, is first the
3 overwhelming importance of understanding the situation on
4 the ground. And I am still dissatisfied with the level of
5 our understanding where the rubber meets the road in a
6 counterinsurgency approach.

7 We don't adequately understand the languages, we
8 don't understand the culture, we don't at many times
9 understand the history. We leave Afghanistan -- if you're
10 an American diplomat or an American soldier, one year at a
11 time. The odds of that diplomat or soldier ever going
12 back to that same area in Afghanistan is almost zero. So
13 when we enter a campaign like this, the overriding lesson
14 for me is that we better understand what we're getting
15 into and what it's going to take to be successful and to
16 be effective there.

17 And then the second thing I'd add in terms of
18 quick lessons is a point that spins off of something John
19 Negroponte mentioned, with regard to our experience in
20 Iraq, and that is as soon as we begin one of these
21 campaigns, we've got to begin to invest immediately in the
22 indigenous security forces, because the tolerance, the

1 level of tolerance, for our presence and the kind of
2 numbers we've had recently will only go down over time.

3 So the early investment, the smart investment,
4 would have been in the years from 2001 to 2006, for
5 example, would've been a much more heavy and concerted
6 focused effort on Afghan security forces, not just the
7 kind of focus we've seen in the last couple of years.

8 GEN. EIKENBERRY: Steve, I would say that the
9 approach that we've tried in Iraq and Afghanistan and used
10 there -- which again only historians 20-25 years from now
11 will be able to fairly evaluate. Has it been resource
12 intensive? Yeah, I've heard some people describe it as
13 trying to achieve revolutionary aims through colonial
14 means. And we need to think about that.

15 But then you also think that even the colonial
16 ways and means that we've adopted were not sufficient at
17 all. Again, back to Chernow's *Life -- Washington: A Life;*
18 by the way, I've read more than that book -- but he's
19 talking about his experiences with raising the troops,
20 raising the colonial troops. And he said in frustration
21 in a letter to the Continental Congress, I spend -- in
22 these 1-year enlistments I spend 6 months getting the

1 troops ready and 6 months thinking about how to demobilize
2 them and our approach in Afghanistan, military and
3 civilian, but we could go on with a very long list.

4 The second would be that we better need to, I
5 think as -- before we plunge deep into an Iraq or
6 Afghanistan, have a more frank debate about ends, ways and
7 means. And you know, do we need to go back and dust off
8 the Weinberger and Powell doctrines, again, I'm not sure
9 here. And perhaps a third point about these kinds of
10 conflicts, let me ask people in this audience, we have an
11 all-volunteer force which is absolutely magnificent. They
12 perform brilliantly. It's not a conscript army.

13 If we had a conscript army good enough to do the
14 job, that's a heroic assumption. But if it was a
15 conscript army good enough to do the job, raise your hand
16 if you think we would've invaded Iraq. Raise your hand if
17 you think 10 years after the intervention in Afghanistan
18 we would have had a 100,000 troops there with a conscript
19 army directly connected to the American people through the
20 populous, through their Congress.

21 So if the answer to that is no, and maybe
22 there's some hands that would go up, but I think the

1 majority would stay down, then there might be something
2 wrong with the Republic if over the last 10 years we've
3 been heavily engaged in war with volunteer forces that are
4 not politically owned by the American people.

5 MR. KROFT: Try over here. Oh.

6 MS. DOZIER: Thank you. Kim Dozier, AP, about
7 to make two enemies with this question. General Lute,
8 will unilateral U.S. counterterrorist actions, otherwise
9 known as drone strikes, continue in the FATA? And
10 Ambassador Rehman, what actions will Pakistan take if the
11 drone strikes continue? Thanks.

12 GEN. LUTE: So our cooperation with Pakistan
13 against al-Qaida leaders today in the border region
14 continues. Obviously, I'm not going to talk just as no
15 one else in this conference has talked about, the
16 specifics. And the reason they continue is that the
17 United States and Pakistan have a common interest here.
18 As I think Ambassador Rehman outlined quite clearly, we've
19 had no more active partner in the fight against al-Qaida
20 than the Pakistanis, and that common interest continues
21 today and that level -- those levels of cooperation that
22 cross different programs across time also continues. So

1 I'll let Sherry speak for herself.

2 AMB. REHMAN: Thank you. Very quickly, Doug, I
3 appreciate what you just said. I think that in Pakistan
4 the view now is very, very clear and unambiguous that
5 drones and drone attacks test the relationship. This is
6 because -- not because we don't want to hurt al-Qaida, but
7 because number one, the drone strikes now see diminishing
8 returns as we all acknowledge al-Qaida is -- the core of
9 al-Qaida is all but eliminated.

10 Also they now radicalize more swades (phonetic)
11 of the population, of the locals, where these strikes
12 happen. And I don't want to get into the specifics of
13 what collateral damage happened or how precise these
14 weapons are. What they do now is they add to the pool of
15 recruits that we are fighting against, and this is what
16 unfortunately inflames public sentiment that the site of
17 that drone, the robotic warfare that from somewhere else
18 across the world is, you know, it opens up all kinds of
19 questions of moral hazard when some -- when another
20 country does this. And there are many questions that open
21 up.

22 Our position is that this is a problem. And no

1 wonder then that you have this view of the United States
2 as having a large predatory footprint, though drones when
3 they hover above us, I'm not saying that this is because
4 they don't -- they haven't assisted in the war against
5 terror. The point is that they now have diminishing
6 returns, and that's a very clear point. We could be
7 seeking an end to drone strikes and there will be no
8 compromise on that. Thank you.

9 MR. KROFT: That's -- I'm sorry, that's all we
10 have time for. I want to thank our panelists and
11 Ambassador Rehman for joining us today, and she knew that
12 she was going to get some heat and wanted to come and take
13 it any way and have the opportunity to present her
14 government's views. But thank you very much for coming
15 and see you next time.

16 (Applause)

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