LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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SPEAKER: Let's get started. So as you see, this next session is titled Homeland Insecurity and the question for the panel in a nutshell is, in the age of terrorism and Twitter how to keep the homeland safe?

To moderate this discussion we're very pleased to have with us Frank Gardner, security correspondent for the BBC. Frank Gardner is the only TV journalist -- network TV journalist in Britain who covers the war on terror full time around the world. He broadcasts almost daily to audiences of millions about Al-Qaeda, terrorism, security and the threat of bio weapons for BBC One TV and BBC Radio 4.

Please join me in welcoming Frank Gardner and this panel.

(Applause)

MR. GARDNER: (Off mic) might be about 10 years out of date. Gordon Corera will be waiting to punch me when I come out of here.

(Laughter)

MR. GARDNER: I'm no longer the only one. There are some brilliant rivals out there as well. Thank you very much for -- well, for still being here actually. My wife said, "You're doing the Aspen Security Forum, you gemy thing." "No, no, it's in Lancaster." "Okay, fine."

And I have to say the word Aspen alone -- yeah, it was just -- I have no hesitation, the best skiing I've ever done was in Aspen two years ago. So, you know, I'm kind of a fan of the place.

We've got a very high caliber panel here today -- as they all are -- and I'm going to introduce them one by one. On my left is Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, who capped a distinguished career in the foreign service, what we call the foreign office in Britain, by being security
minister and also chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. That role is now, as in chairman of the JIC, the Joint Intelligence Committee, passed to Charles Farr at the end here, who has just finished spending several years sorting out Britain's homeland security challenges as running something called the OSCT. Whitehall absolutely loves all these acronyms and stuff and so does Charles.

It's the Office of Security and Counterterrorism. It's probably called something else by tomorrow. So Charles has a lot of experience in kind of putting together the fusion of overseas intelligence with domestic intelligence and trying to make it work. And he has now got to pull back and think big about the longer term challenges for security in this country.

But our guest of honor today is Deputy Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, who is the deputy secretary of Homeland Security. So he is effectively the chief operating officer for the third largest government department in the United States. He spent 12 years as a federal prosecutor in L.A. But, you know, he is quite a nice guy apart from that. And he also -- immediately prior to this he ran the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, so he led the administration of his country's legal immigration services. So I'm really hoping that we're going to get some input from Deputy Secretary on how things are done differently in the States.

I'm going to start off probably to really to almost get it out of the way, the whole Brexit debate thing, in which -- by the way, the BBC is agnostic. We absolutely don't take sides, or even if we wanted to, we can't. There's a lot of debate about whether we are safer in terms of counterterrorism in or out. You probably all heard the words of the U.S. president this morning, very much saying that Britain and Europe are safer with Britain staying in the EU. But I thought let's start by asking Deputy Secretary Mayorkas for his views?

MR. MAYORKAS: It would be no surprise to all of you that I share the president's view in respect to --
(Laughter)

MR. GARDNER: He likes his job.

MR. MAYORKAS: -- a response. Let me say this, in the realm of national security, especially in a case where we share an adversary, the response cannot be an individualized response but must be a community response and it is our view that the community is stronger with the U.K. remaining a part of it. And I think that in sum really represents our position. We understand it's an issue that will be decided by people in the U.K., but from our perspective in an area where information sharing is so vital to segregate one country from the community with which we share I think is suboptimal.

MR. GARDNER: The counter argument that I sometimes hear from certain people in police and counterterrorism but people who don't necessarily want to be quoted, the counter argument to that is that, look, the strongest most important intelligence sharing relationship that the UK has is not with Europe, it's with the United States, and even within Europe, it's bilateral rather than multilateral. If Rob Wainwright is still in the room, I'm hoping he will challenge me when it comes to questions. But I'm wondering, Deputy Secretary, if you could give us some examples. And bear in mind that this is being live streamed, so I'm sure ISIS are watching this sitting in Raqqa sipping mint tea. Could you give us perhaps just some sanitized examples of when people talk about this incredible depth of Anglo-US intelligence cooperation, what does that mean?

MR. MAYORKAS: Well, let me if I can counter the counter for just a moment before I answer that question. While our relationship, our partnership is strongest with the U.K. that does not mean that we don't have other strong partnerships here in Europe, number one. Number two, while the sharing of information can be bilateral, that doesn't mean that it isn't multilateral as well in other instances. One is not necessarily at the exclusion of the other. And so I would respectfully disagree with the counter argument.
The sharing of information is sometimes case specific, sometimes involves analysis of information that we all have. It sometimes involves the sharing of information and the analysis that only or several have with others who don't have it. It is sometimes predictive. It runs the gamut from a particular incident to a trend or pattern or a development that really poises all of us to be prepared for what might happen next.

MR. GARDNER: Thanks. Now, the advantage of having someone like Dame Pauline Neville-Jones here is that she has been inside the tenet for a lot of time. But now that she is outside, I'm hoping she is going to speak incredibly freely and probably quite rudely.

So, Pauline, from your perspective as a neutral observer now, do you think the U.K. has got it right on homeland security? Well, how many marks out of 10 would you give us -- us being the country?

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: Seven to eight out of 10 I think. Quite high marks -- quite high marks, yeah.

MR. GARDNER: Okay. And the two and half that are lacking, what are those for?

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: They lie in the most difficult end, not surprisingly. They lie in how you bring about a situation in which people are not tempted actually to go for terrorism.

MR. GARDNER: So the --

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: It's the soft end, it's the prevent end, yes, which I think everybody would agree is quite the most difficult end. It's the long-term end. It's the end where you have great difficulty in striking the right balance between what the law provides and we've had to strengthened the law in ways which are -- could be seen as being counter to free speech and potentially threatening to the values of society, on the one hand. So getting -- you know, not going any further down that road than you need to is very important.
At the same time, providing the state with powers that it needs for investigation and for actually reducing or actually criminalizing some of the things which are very noxious, like the ability to promote bands (phonetic) from the platform, which we've had to make illegal. That's one side of things.

The other side of things obviously is how you go about countering the insidious propaganda, very cleverly promoted, you know, Twitter -- but the clever promotion both in terms of technology and in terms of the language and the appeal used by ISIS, Daesh: the claim they have to finding a state, the money they've got behind it, all of these things are actually relatively new. I mean Al-Qaeda by comparison was a comparative poor organization facing the power of states. Actually, they are much more formidable in numerous ways.

And how you both deal with that at a general level, how you create the climate in your schools, in your institutions where people are not tempted and how to deal with individuals who have gotten into trouble. Both how you de-radicalize the radicalized, how you try to prevent radicalization and indeed how you have to track people who are actually on the road to doing bad things.

And all of those require tremendous attention to detail. The process is very important. I mean law and the outcomes in society are marginally judged by, well, how did you do. In this sort of area it's not only how did you do; how did you do it so that you don't actually destroy the things that you're trying to defend. And so, you know -- also how the law operates and particularly in the sensitive area of the powers that the state may take, you know, to intercept.

MR. GARDNER: Charles --

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: Therefore --

MR. GARDNER: Thank you. Charles, do you want to respond to that and how many marks out of 10 would you give your own department -- the previous department's
work?

MR. FARR: I'm not going to respond in fact to that. Sorry. Let me if I may just make a couple of comments there. First of all, as you know and I'm sure everyone here knows, we're facing a completely different terrorist threat. You know, we have threat levels which stay the same, but the underlying threat is completely different. We face a threat which is much greater in size than anything we've faced before and it's a simple point but actually it is the fundamental difference. We face an enemy which is more capable, has more resources and is trying to do things in a different way, which is probably more effective than Al-Qaeda.

And all our systems -- all our systems be they U.S., U.K. or other European or European itself all of them are adapting to this new threat. And we are through that process. And some of us have adapted more in one area than in another, but we are all adapting. And I hesitate to award marks out of 10 because that's a continuous process, as you know.

The main thing that we just have to understand is that terrorism has changed and counterterrorism has changed and the change has been more profound in both those areas than we might have imagined four or five years ago, even frankly two or three -- and it's continuing.

MR. GARDNER: Could you --

MR. MAYORKAS: Can I add to the --

MR. GARDNER: Yes.

MR. MAYORKAS: -- point made, which I think is a very important one, the sort of soft side, if you will. This is also an area where if we act unilaterally we will not succeed. If we come in to a community and we say in the States, you know, we are here from the government and we are here to help, that is going to be of limited resonance. And so what we have done is we've enlisted people in the community, especially youth to communicate the message, religious leaders. I think the U.K. has done
a phenomenal job in building a similar program and we actually intend to replicate some of their best practices.

We created in the Department of Homeland Security an office for community partnerships. And partnership is the operative word not only with respect to the first question that you posed to me, but I think to the point that was just made. If we do it alone, we will not succeed. If we lend our resources, our knowledge, if we achieve a greater awareness in the community and really empower them to act, I think we have a much better chance of achieving the soft side that was referred to.

MR. GARDNER: One of the comments -- I suppose probably criticisms that people sometimes have made privately to me about the way things are done in the U.S. -- and forgive me if this is a little indiscreet, but people say you're just too big, you've got so many different -- you've got 16 different intelligence agencies. In the U.K. they've boiled it right down to JTAC, you know, this fusion sent to the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, hundred or so people, where you pool together -- a little bit like NCTC, your National Counterterrorism Center, but you pool all the kind of centers of excellence, foreign office, intelligence agencies and the Ministry of Defence and so on. And that in the States you are a bit too unwieldy. What would you say to that?

MR. MAYORKAS: I would say we were unwieldy. We are more integrated now than we were yesterday and we will be more integrated tomorrow than we are today. In the soft side of things I think we recognize that unwieldiness and the inefficiencies that we gained because of it and we actually created a taskforce that brings everyone together in that space for a more unified effort.

And so I think the criticism is at times and in some instances fair. Otherwise I don't size is determinative. It's a question of how well we are integrated in our efforts and what respective resources and capabilities we bring to bear.

MR. GARDNER: Now, the Syrian conflict, as
everybody knows, has completely transformed the landscape of counterterrorism in Europe and further afield as well and obviously in the Middle East as well. And we tend to forget that. We tend to focus on what the effect has been on Europe, but it has also has had a major effect on the countries in the region, not just Syria and Iraq. I mean it poses huge problems for countries like Jordan and Lebanon.

The U.S. seems to have dodged this. Is there -- I mean I'm wondering what you would describe that to. Is that just brilliant work by the Department of Homeland Security and your domestic counterterrorism? Is it that U.S. citizens are rather more loyal and less inclined to terrorism than the tiny proposition of Europe based people who go off to become terrorists?

MR. MAYORKAS: So I would respectfully disagree with the statement that we have dodged it. I think you have quite a number of families and affected individuals in San Bernardino, California that would --

MR. GARDNER: Okay.

MR. MAYORKAS: -- quite frankly submit otherwise. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has people under investigation in every state in our country.

MR. GARDNER: Related to ISIS -- ISIL?

MR. MAYORKAS: Related to radicalism, whether it's a pledged allegiance to ISIL or a different terrorist group, but related to terrorism. So I think we suffered an incident recently in San Bernardino, California. We've indicted a number of people. We have quite a number of people under investigation. And I think that we are ever vigilant and we understand how real the threat is.

MR. GARDNER: Okay. I mean my apologies.

MR. MAYORKAS: No, no, no.

MR. GARDNER: I mean what I meant was that compared to Europe, which is a frenetic pace. But I
didn't realize one in every state. I mean that's --

MR. FARR: You heard it here first.

MR. MAYORKAS: Hopefully, not first. But --

(Laughter)

MR. MAYORKAS: You know, we do benefit from geography.

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: I was just going to say --

yeah.

MR. MAYORKAS: So in this instance distance is, you know, of great benefit.

MR. GARDNER: Charles, I realize that now as chairman of the JIC your remit gets rather wider than just plain homeland security. But given that this session is rather ingeniously called Homeland Insecurity, I wonder if you could tell us that over the last how many years it is you were doing that job, running the Office of Security and Counterterrorism, what kept you awake at night -- I mean you can be, you know, decent about it?

(Laughter)

SPEAKER: Thank you, Frank.

MR. FARR: I would be at home having things to do.

MR. GARDNER: I mean I watch Doctor Who.

MR. FARR: I think I had a huge amount of confidence from the very beginning of 2007, which is when I was starting that, in the inherent strength of our system, particularly to investigate and disrupt terrorists, but also actually to put a layer of protective security around our targets and to be able to respond quickly when we suffered from a terrorist incident. And that is a consequence of years of significant investment by governments of all persuasions, a high degree of
professionalism, partly the experience of running a counterterrorist campaign in Ireland, which was very, very different but had some similarities.

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: We learnt a lot actually.

MR. FARR: Yeah. And partly of course of the very close working relationship which we have with the Americans and also with many others. And that was a very, very sound basis for what we were doing and it remains that case now. And I think we have -- you know, we're now facing enormous challenges from Daesh, greater challenges than we faced undoubtedly at any point since 9/11 and probably before. But we are as well placed as we could be to deal with them, which is not saying it's not challenging, but we can be reassured by what we've put in place.

MR. GARDNER: I know that cyber is going to come up a lot in the next session, but you can't discuss counterterrorism without taking into account the whole cyber factor as well. And I would say that alongside Brexit are we safer in or out. The whole debate over security versus privacy is the other big sort of talking point in this area.

Charles has been very much involved in this because he was a proponent of what was rather rudely called the Snoopers' Charter by the Lib Dems I think and has now been reconstituted in something similar but with more safeguards in it. Charles, I wonder if you just tell us, the Investigatory Powers Bill that is going through parliament at the moment, what will that allow law enforcement and particularly intelligence and counterterrorism what will it allow you to do and what reassurance would you give people that our information, our personal details are not going to end up in the hands of the Gambling Commission or the local county council?

MR. FARR: So it's obviously a horribly complex subject. But let me reduce it to very simple principles. For as long as any of us can remember who have worked in areas of national security, we and most other governments in Western Europe have relied on the interception of
communications for our intelligence. It's not the only source, it's not often the best source, but it is a key source. And historically that intelligence has come from people speaking on sort of copper wire telephones and on old style mobiles.

We now are in a new generation of communications technology and we have lost the ability to intercept to get people's communications in the way that we always have. And the reason for that is fundamentally technical. Communications have gone online. They are taking different routes. They are more complicated to identify. You need more data -- we could go on.

The fundamental principle of the government's proposals -- successive governments by the way have looked at this -- is that the state should be able to intercept communications which go over the internet in the way that it was intercepted for years and years and years communications which go over a copper wire.

Now, you know, personally from where I sat that sounded logical to me. I mean the alternative is very simply that you go dark and you cannot rely on interception in the way that you would want. Now, that would be difficult at the best of time, but of course we are going dark at the very time when we have a greater threat than ever before and the threat from an organization which knows very precisely thanks to Snowden and others the limits of our capability and is calibrating its operational behavior accordingly.

So you have states around Europe -- ours is one; we are probably better placed than many others -- states around Europe who are losing the ability to do what they have always done and you have an organization which is aware that they are losing the capability and is ensuring by its use of technology that it continues to lose it.

The bill at its simplest is an attempt to readdress that balance by a number of technical means enabling the state to require the owners of communication services to retain more data and provide some more access to state organizations, be it the police or the security
service.

The additional access that is being proposed albeit for the same broad end to intercept communications is subject to greater degrees of oversight and it is confined to fewer organizations. So the old stuff which, you know, frankly I thought was always a bit overdone of local councils intercepting people's phones -- they never could do that of course -- you know, they've been in the wrong place was never true and it clearly isn't true of the current legislation that's going through at the moment. The powers are bound tight and they are limited to specific organizations.

But I just want to emphasize the key principle here. This is about a power which we have had for years in democracies in the western world. It's not particular to the U.K. or indeed to the U.S. Every other European country will be using it. We are losing that power because of technology. We want to adapt the power to new technology, full stop.

MR. GARDNER: The Snowden revelations by the NSA contractor with Snowden I think were -- talking to everybody, everybody said they were incredibly damaging. But they also opened up a very valuable debate. Do you think -- and Deputy Secretary I'm addressing this to you -- do you think that there was a strategic error made by both Britain and the U.S. in not briefing parliament in our case, Congress in yours on what exactly the powers were and coming clean?

Because what it -- to my mind as a journalist observing this is allowed it with Snowden to pull the debate the way he wanted and say, look, what they're doing. And actually if GCHQ or NSA had perhaps been a little more forthright to lawmakers, people would have said, "Okay, yeah, I get that; I understand that."

Do you think a strategic error was made there? Because I think you've kind of -- both British and American governments have lost -- they've lost a lot of sympathy, they've lost a lot of the middle ground sympathy on this one?
MR. MAYORKAS: The questions whether had we more fully informed our legislature in a classified setting whether that would have in any way dulled the public response is a -- I'm not sure it would have quite frankly. I think the general citizen of the United States would have had a strong reaction irrespective of a legislative body's knowledge in a classified setting. This is a matter of public -- a broader public concern and I just don't think we could have done so.

MR. GARDNER: Charles?

MR. FARR: First of all, I think it really is important to emphasize frankly -- you know this very well that the powers and more particularly the capabilities that were being exercised in the States and the U.K. were different. They rested on different capabilities and we were doing different things. And though the collaboration was very close these weren't identical systems just sitting two on each side of the Atlantic, point one.

And then, secondly, I think it's fair to say across the whole of the democratic world the nature of oversight irrespective of Snowden actually has just been changing over the past 10 or 15 years as different powers have had to be acquired to keep up with different threats. And everyone I know -- and it was my own experience working inside security and intelligence agencies -- welcomed greater oversight and recognized it was the appropriate response to different, albeit in some ways also, greater powers. And it was vital for retaining public assurance in the works that the agencies were doing.

Was the balance out before or after Snowden? You know, you could debate that. I mean I think certainly now when we've just talked about the bill, it's clear that there has been a massive increase in the degree of oversight and understanding of the day-to-day operational work of the agencies by parliamentary select committees.

MR. GARDNER: Pauline?
MS. NEVILLE-JONES: But I don't want -- I think that ground was lost after the Snowden revelations. I don't actually think it was for GCHQ to do the job, but it was ministerial and they run for cover to be quite frank. And they said -- the most they could bring themselves to say was "if you haven't done anything wrong, you've nothing to fear."

There's been much more attempt now subsequently to explain and to reassure and there's been a big effort on the part of government and officials to brief properly in parliament and the legislation is more carefully drafted. And the oversight, as Charles has said, and the potential -- you know, the oversight that will come in with the new regime is greatly increased.

The issue is going to be proportionality and the limits. That's I think where the debate will focus. I think that there has been growing understanding in all of this actually even amongst those who don't really like this invasion of the need for it. And therefore the question is going to be, you know, the limits and the proportionality and the supervision, the how of it as well as the what of it.

If I might say just one thing that you mentioned, sound security, because it does strike me as being the case -- I mean this title is Homeland Insecurity. I think one of the things that increasingly makes individuals feel insecure is not just the terrorist threat, it's actually the threat of having your money taken away from you through a swipe crime and through cyber theft.

You know, this is a real threat to the individual. We're not going to continue to be continuously indemnified by the banks. People are going to suffer real losses. So the whole question of capability of the individual to protect themselves and to know how to do it is becoming I think a very, very big issue. And, no, I do more cyber than I do other things
these days and one of the things that's very, very clear is that the increasing sophistication, determination, coverage, spreads, size of the threat that is developing, more of it is directed at the corporate world because after all -- and the banks, that's where the money is. But the individuals are not excluded.

So I do think that that is a source, you know, of sort of daily worry as distinct from, you know, "am I going to a dangerous place for my holiday," which is the other kind of thing that people have these days to calculate.

So I just wanted to mention that because I think that the concept of risk in society which governments have, you know, become accustomed to is not something I think that individuals have really had to think about in the past; what is my personal -- how vulnerable am I to certain things, what do I try and do about it.

And I think we need to try and master that if we're not to become extremely anxious and worried as a society, and therefore, less calm, less tolerant and probably in the end less democratic.

MR. MAYORKAS: But the nature of the threat really helps define an individual's perspective on his or her stability.

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: It demands a lot though --

MR. MAYORKAS: So a pecuniary threat while it exist is very different than a threat of one's ability to, you know, remain safe in a very -- more fundamental --

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: But it's just a source of insecurity in society --

MR. MAYORKAS: It is.

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: -- without a doubt.
MR. MAYORKAS: Right.

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: And it can greatly damage the reputation of the state to protect people.

MR. MAYORKAS: It is -- if I can go just back to one point. Yes. But I will tell you, I've spoken to many of people having hailed from California for many years.

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: Yeah.

MR. MAYORKAS: You know, they can take a hurricane, but when the ground underneath them starts to move, it's a very different feeling of insecurity.

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: Okay.

MR. MAYORKAS: I don't think that in our experience a level of oversight has not necessarily calmed the fervor of privacy advocates with respect to the ability to intercept communication.

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: I think someone will always be opposed.

MR. MAYORKAS: And the phone -- what's different now is that the means of communication contain so much more data and so the breadth of exposure people I think feel is far greater. Now, on the mobile phone it's not just their -- their business communications, their personal communications, their banking and the likes. So I think the privacy interests at least from privacy advocates' perspective is a much deeper and wider one.

But we've always had oversight. We've never sought to intercept a communication without an independent judicial body determining that there is sufficient cause to do so and sufficient protections in terms of the scope and duration of the interception. So I think oversight helps, but it certainly doesn't answer the question.
MS. NEVILLE-JONES: We don't know what to do about inscription, it's an unsolved issue.

MR. MAYORKAS: True.

MR. GARDNER: I'm very aware we're running out of time, and if I go overtime, some large men from the secret service are going to throw me bodily off the stage. So -- and we don't want that.

What I do want is your questions, though, because we've got six minutes left -- oh, generously 10, my God, okay, who knew. 10 minutes left. John? And if you could all -- if you could say who you are and where you are from.

SPEAKER: (Off mic) has its objective the maintenance of normal life. Most senior officials from security agencies will say their major objective is quite obviously in a way to prevent bombs and attacks taking place in the homeland. I mean that's the primary objective.

But we couldn't say that over the last 12, 14, 16 years the fear of terrorism has reduced in our countries, probably the opposite. Should that be an objective of a counterterrorism strategy or are we always going to find ourselves reacting and worrying about attacks rather than the insecurity (sic) our populations feel? And is normal life ultimately becoming abnormal?

MR. GARDNER: Who wants to answer that? You're all eminently qualified, but which one of you wants to answer that?

MR. MAYORKAS: I'll jump into that because, you know, when I was a child in elementary school we had bomb drills, but never during my youth do I remember having to employ that drill in a real-life situation. And so it felt almost like a game against something that was so remote from our reality.
My children now go through active shooter drills in the United States and they don't quite frankly -- either the school administrators and teachers nor my children have that same feeling of remoteness because we have had incidents, whether they be terrorist incidents or quite frankly just gun violence in our country.

I don't view it as my role -- and maybe this is mistaken or maybe I'm not thinking expansively enough, but I don't view it as my role to distill or dispense with the fear but rather to ensure that the vigilance is executed. And that in fact they are undertaking those active shooter drills and they understand what the threat is, that they understand that at the same time that we will do everything we can to protect their security. We are also going to protect the values and principles that guide us all and that we're going to just work very hard.

I don't necessarily think that an awareness of the threat which can cause a certain level of nervousness is necessarily a bad thing. It's an unfortunate reality. I used to be able to walk onto an airplane straight from the car that dropped me off. It's not that way anymore. That's the reality in which we live and I just want to ensure that people understand that reality, are vigilant and nevertheless live their lives in the American way with great pride.

MR. GARDNER: Thanks. Charles?

MR. FARR: So your characterization is of course exactly right and the headline at the front of our counter-terror strategy still I believe that's under revision was not to eliminate terrorism or to stop all terrorist attacks. It was exactly as you say to deal with terrorism in a way that people -- allows people to go about their lives in a normal way. And I think that is and has been in our minds since 2001 or certainly 2003 when it was first mooted.

And I think it's really important -- it goes actually back to the last bit of the conversation -- not
just to highlight what new powers governments have introduced, but also to highlight powers that they have withdrawn, because this government and other governments actually have not just added to the pile, they've taken things from it. And powers which we felt and said to governments at the time were disproportionate, not having significant benefit and actually alienating significant numbers of people have been withdrawn.

MR. GARDNER: Like stop-and-search?

MR. FARR: Like stop-and-search without suspicion, where we went from --

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: As a police power because --

MR. FARR: As a police power, yes. I mean -- and I think the American position in some way the same. You went from very, very, very large numbers, tens of thousands of people stop-and-search in London alone each year to zero. We removed some of the powers, enabling not the principal power but some of the conditions in which you could exercise the power of stopping people out of suspicion at a border.

Both those powers -- or on both those powers we got more mail than anything else we were doing and both of them were amended. And it was very clearly with a view to that parameter from our program: have we got the balance wrong, are we making life less normal than we need to? And I think we've done a lot else actually in, for example, a rather technical area, not having highly obtrusive and very ugly and protective security disfiguring our city.

It happens. It is far less in some of our cities than in many cities around the world, you know, where you go and you look like -- it looks like you are walking into a fortress. And that is abnormal. And undoubtedly in other major cities around the world I think it has a very, very corrosive effect and gives people a sense that they are living inside a fortress and are
beleaguered. Sometimes of course they are, but not always.

MR. GARDNER: I think there's an element of psychology in all of this because the nature of terrorism is that it is graphic and it is calculated to inflict harm and pain on fellow human beings in a way that a motor road traffic accident is not, and ergo, it kind of captures the imagination. And ISIS, ISIL, Daesh have taken that to extremes with their cinematography: the whole idea of the slow death of the helpless hostage in the orange jumpsuit has really caught people's imagination.

The marauding terrorist's firearms attacks going through Paris, Brussels and before that Mumbai, you know, these are things that really shock people. So terrorism has a much bigger impact on the psyche. It kind of punches above its weight in that sense. And a recent statistic I read was that when Americans go abroad, they are 10 times more likely to be killed or injured in a road traffic accident than they are to be caught up in terrorism.

I mean when Ebola surfaced a few years ago in Central Africa and, you know, the media, we flooded it with stories about it. But actually people pointed out the number of people getting killed by malaria was many, many times in those countries the number of people being killed by Ebola. But it was the sheer horror of bleeding from pores and, you know, this horrific kind of Hollywood death that -- you know, outbreak style.

Okay, we've got time for two more questions, if you can make them brief. One here. And actually if we got any ladies here. So I'm going to be a bit gender equality egalitarian about this. No? So you and then you, yeah.

SPEAKER: (inaudible), London. I was very interested in the discussion about the ability of the agencies to intercept data and a very powerful argument about the technology changing. I'd like to also ask
though to what extent is the difficulty the government seems to be having in this area based in the US and the UK also as a result of the involvement of the private sector more broadly.

So my question context is whether or not you are satisfied in both the US and the UK as to whether or not we've got the correct mechanisms for working with the private sectors in this area. Thank you.

MR. GARDNER: I'm going to ask you both to give very brief answers if you can because then we can take the last question there.

MR. MAYORKAS: I would say this issue is unresolved quite frankly the inscription, the challenge of accessing data that is critical to our security interest. We have not found a place of common ground with the private sector.

Legislation is being proposed, which is a compulsory resolution. But we need a further dialogue and further work on this. We are not in the same place right now.

MR. GARDNER: Charles?

MR. FARR: Well, one of the trends over the past 15 years on national security issue has been the privatization of data. I mean it used to be the case that basically the state owned data relevant to national security. And the big transition is that the state no longer does. Around three key areas, travel, finance and communications, the state isn't the primary owner of the data and that is what is causing friction between the public and private sector.

And we have managed I think on two of those three areas to come up with a solution, finance and travel. And on the third, we have partial fixes, but we fundamentally don't. Part of the reason for that of course is that the companies believe that their customers
are much more interested in their privacy than in stopping terrorist attacks, which -- as they've put it to me at least. And, you know, I've said I don't think that's true and the polling suggests it's not true, but I don't believe it.

MR. GARDNER: Interesting. Final question, yeah.

MR. EVANS: Michael Evans (phonetic) from the Times. This is for Charles. What's the principal reason why you think ISIS is more effective than Al-Qaeda?

MR. FARR: It's hard to narrow it down to one. I might cheat. So Daesh is a product of the social media age. It's hard to see that Daesh could have been the organization that it is without social media because social media has enabled it to do what Al-Qaeda never could do, which is to reach a mass audience not just once, but continuously. And Al-Qaeda never had that option, and therefore, stayed an elite and a cellular small organization.

Daesh had different options. It was born in the age of social media, not VHS, and it went in a completely different direction. If it wasn't for social media it's very hard to see for me how it could have done that. There are other reasons, but I -- you know, I think the online environment I would still put very high at the top.

MR. MAYORKAS: But wouldn't you also say that their call to action is very different?

MR. FARR: Their call to action is very different.

MR. MAYORKAS: Their call to action is very different.

MR. FARR: But it is absolutely different. And I'm not --
MR. MAYORKAS: And the social media feeds into that very much.

MR. FARR: But they -- I don't know whether they could have developed that call to action --

MR. MAYORKAS: Agreed.

MR. FARR: -- without a mechanism to convey it.

MR. MAYORKAS: I agree.

MR. FARR: I mean the two went hand-in-hand.

MR. GARDNER: Pauline, do you want to add a final word?

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: Well, I think on the substance -- I mean now even on the fact that they claim to represent a state, you know, increases their -- and they've got money to back it in a big way.

MR. GARDNER: Yeah.

MS. NEVILLE-JONES: But I think that they use the media -- I mean clearly the media they've got to use is very important there. Also, their use of it is extremely sophisticated. And they can do one-to-one in a way that Al-Qaeda can never do one-to-one. And so you can go on talking to this vulnerable individual until you finally got them, you know. And then they are encouraged to go and get their friends and their girlfriends as well as their -- if it's a man and so on.

So they build a network and then they get the people who have already gone over to come along and persuade. So it's extremely sophisticated networking activity online of a kind quite rightly that ends up being immensely effective on those who are caught by it. And you have to get -- the counter messaging that you have to do has to be done by people who have credibility in the eyes of the listeners. They are very hard to find.
I mean one of the things we haven't said. But clearly, you know, in this -- with this international terrorism, which is -- and we haven't talked about rightwing extremism. We are talking Islamism obviously. We cannot do this without the Muslim community and we cannot do this without Muslim leadership and we cannot do it without the individual help of Muslims in our society. They are the people who in the end have to do the, you know, counter ideological work in their community.

MR. GARDNER: Thanks very much. Right. Sadly we're going to have to wrap it there or as I say the large men will come. Can you join me in thanking our panel, Charles Farr ---

(Applause)

MR. GARDNER: -- Alejandro Mayorkas and Pauline Neville-Jones.

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