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MR. ERVIN: All right. Well, during the course of the last session, of course, we took a look back and a look forward at the Iraq War and in this session, we're going to do likewise with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan as well.

And I cannot think of anyone better to lead that discussion than Steve Kroft, who incidentally went to extraordinary logistical lengths to get here today to be with us. Steve Kroft has been a correspondent for CBS News' 60 Minutes for 23 years, and of course, 60 Minutes, we all know, is the most watched news program on television.

His story on insider trading in the United States Congress drove the recent passage of the STOCK Act. He's the only 60 Minutes correspondent to win two Peabody Awards in the same year, bringing his total number of television's most prestigious award to five. One was for a story on the vulnerabilities of infrastructure to computer hackers, a story and an issue that's of importance to us, of course, and the other was on the
enormous sums of money spent prolonging the lives of dying Americans.

Steve has won television journalism's highest honor, the duPont-Columbia University Journalism Silver Baton twice. Please join me in welcoming Steve Kroft in this terrific panel.

(Applause)

MR. KROFT: Thank you very much. We're following Iraq with Afghanistan, and we have a very distinguished group here today. On my left is Ambassador Eklil Hakimi who is the ambassador to the United States from Afghanistan. Next to him is Doug Lute, who is a presidential assistant on the -- in the area of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and next to him is Karl Eikenberry, former ambassador to Afghanistan.

And we have on teleconference, Ambassador Sherry Rehman, who was unable to make it today because of a prior commitment, several teleconferences with the government in Islamabad, but she was kind enough and wanted to be here badly enough to agree to talk to us here by teleconference. So you can see her sitting back there or you can see her in the television monitors around the
Gentlemen, I want to begin this by -- with a quote from a recent article by Dexter Filkins in The New Yorker published earlier this month on the situation in Afghanistan.

Filkins writes, "After 11 years, nearly 2,000 Americans killed, 16,000 Americans wounded, nearly $400 billion spent and more than 12,000 Afghan civilians dead since 2007, the war in Afghanistan has come down to this, the United States' leading mission not accomplished. Objectives once deemed indispensable such as nation building and counterinsurgency have been abandoned or downgraded either because they haven't worked or because there was no longer enough time to achieve them."

Do you agree with that assessment? We'll start with you, Ambassador.

AMB. HAKIMI: With due respect, I don't agree; a) because our people, they don't want to go to those dark days of Civil War and also to dark days of Taliban who ruled the country. And now we have strong military, we have strong police forces, we have vibrant civil society, we have a very active media with a liberty that you cannot
find within that region, and economic growth for the last 10 years, remarkable, and more importantly, our own people, they are frustrated of war and they are thirsty of peace, and they don't want to go back.

And if you look at that within the region context, no country within the region, they want that to happen. Afghanistan, as our history taught us, it's located within the heart of Asia. If a heart is not functioning and not pumping the blood within the system, so the whole body's not working. And no country within the region as far as I know, they want an Afghanistan to slip back to the civil war.

They want Afghanistan to be integrated economically within the region, and also we have signed strategic partnership agreements with our key allies, with the United States of America, with United Kingdom, with France, Italy, Germany, Australia, India and a lot others are coming -- it's in the pipeline and that will give the assurance for a enduring partnership for the years to come.

MR. KROFT: Doug Lute, you agree?

GEN. LUTE: I'd say Dexter Filkins has it wrong
on two counts. First of all, the mission is -- will not yet fully accomplish. The mission against al-Qaida, the core mission that President Obama has set out, which is to disrupt, dismantle and eventually defeat al-Qaida, as referred over the last day and a half, is within sight. So it's not yet accomplished, no one is saying mission accomplished, but we are saying that that mission is within sight.

The other point where he's wrong is we're not leaving. I mean people are missing this, okay. If one of the major outcomes of the Chicago Summit just 2 months ago was that while we're on a path to transition the security league fully to Afghan responsibility in 30 months by the end of 2014, even beyond 2014, we imagine at Afghan invitation that there'll be a continuing, sustained U.S. presence, military presence, diplomatic presence, intelligence presence that will also be supplemented by a presence from our NATO coalition members.

So the mission's not yet accomplished, but it's within sight, and we're not leaving.

MR. KROFT: Karl Eikenberry?

GEN. EIKENBERRY: Thanks, Steve. I can't resist
-- at the outset, I was telling Steve I know I've
definitely left government and military service when I'm
comfortable sitting on the stage with television with 60
Minutes.

(Laughter)

GEN. EIKENBERRY: Three points; first of all,
what do we know about the mission what we've accomplished.
I think back to 9/11, al-Qaida is not in Afghanistan in
any kind of big numbers and al-Qaida has been weakened
over this last decade and was dealt a very heavy blow last
year that was from a base in Afghanistan that that blow
was dealt.

Secondly, in terms of governance in Afghanistan,
fragile, but Afghanistan over the last decade has been
through four elections, they've been flawed elections, but
from an Afghan perspective, look back at 1992-1993, how
did power get decided at that point? It was a group of
warlords gathered around the capital firing rockets into
the city, tens of thousands of Kabulis dying, massacres
that have followed.

So from an Afghan perspective, how do politics
look right now? Fragile, but better than they've looked
in many, many years.

Third point about successes; in the economic-social service domain, transformational in terms of education. In 2001 there were a million Afghans going to school. Now there's over 7 million. About 40 percent of those are women. Medical care, health care services been transformed; we know this. What don't we know? We don't know then going forward, will these gains all hold. Will there be reversals?

What we also do not know and then probably historians will have to tell us and maybe the panel will talk about this is was the ends, ways and means that the Americans at least adopted for the campaign in Afghanistan, were they sound.

The third would be just to agree with what Doug had said that the mission is not over; the mission is now being redefined. It's going from one where the international community has very much been in the lead in Afghanistan in all the critical domains to one in which the Afghans are in the lead. So we're going from a position of lead to a position of support. So it's a change of mission, not an end of mission.
MR. KROFT: I want to hear what Ambassador Rehman has to say about this. What is the perspective from -- or from Pakistan?

AMB. REHMAN: Yes, thank you, Steve. I hope you can hear me. I certainly share the hope and the vision that members on this panel have articulated very carefully that Afghanistan is looking to a future where war finally comes to an end. There's clearly war fatigue in the region.

Pakistan is committed to -- unequivocally committed to maintaining the peace, security, and stability, but we look forward to a time where there is a modicum and measure of sustainable peace in Afghanistan. We hope to support all efforts in that endeavor. And you know, very quickly, I'd like to say that most important in all this thread is that Afghanistan belongs to Afghanistan, which is an effort that we all have to bring capacity and resource to, and I say "all" because there's the United States of America with its big footprint.

We're next door and through every difficult time and challenge we have supported Afghanistan. We still host the world's largest population of refugees with our
Afghan brothers and sisters and I stress the position of sisters by saying that, you know, one of the primary concerns of women all over the world, and I speak not just for Pakistan, is the status and position of women in the future where we hope that there is not a security vacuum in areas where the ANSF or local forces are not strong enough or consolidated or cohesive enough to bring to bear the level of force needed to maintain the fragile gains that we've mentioned here.

There certainly have been gains. They shouldn't be reversible and we are obviously going to do our best to ensure that not just our border areas but there's a security vacuum there very often, those become -- they don't remain sanctuaries for terrorists. So we have sanctuaries on both sides, which is troubling for Pakistan because it signals to us perhaps a volatility in the days ahead and we're informed by -- well, 30 years ago we joined the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and really we -- I think that we lost the peace.

We may have won the war, but we lost the peace there, and now we need to be in a position where if we think that we have won the war, then we certainly need to
worry about protecting a peace that will show the way forward to a secure, stable and economically viable Afghanistan that can meet its own needs.

We may be a few miles away from that, but I think our job here is to without meddling in Afghanistan to ensure that it is able to remain stable, cohesive and runs as inclusive a government in the future days to come as possible. And certainly Pakistan is engaged in important trilateral meetings at what we call the core group between the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

We will continue to facilitate the intensification of the dialogue at all levels and we really hope that the level of interdiction at our border, the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan goes up because we are beginning to feel a little bit of blow-back from redeployments, ISAF redeployments away from the border in Afghanistan. And I do hope that a great deal of what we look towards in the future is going to go beyond the planning stages.

Execution of policy is crucial, and as I said, maintaining the gains made by NATO-ISAF and Afghanistan in these 12 years with the amount of blood and treasure spent
should not be wasted. That should be our main goal right now and to preserve the security and stability of all components of the population, which includes women.

MR. KROFT: Okay. I have a question for General Eikenberry. I want to go back to the figures mentioned here. I can see that we killed Osama bin Laden. I would concede that the deterioration of that organization, al-Qaeda in Afghanistan has been severely damaged, but we're talking huge numbers here. We're talking 2,000 Americans killed, 16,000 Americans wounded, $400 billion and we are leaving a situation where the Taliban still has a very robust defense.

They have sanctuaries in Afghanistan or in Pakistan on the borders. There is still, I'm sure the ambassador would agree, a great deal of corruption and I don't think anybody believes that the Taliban is going to be defeated in the next 2 years or that the government of Pakistan is going to be functioning western-style government.

I guess what I'm saying is are we, in effect, just cutting our losses right now, because it has proven to be too difficult to do all of the things that we have
talked about doing and too expensive, both in life and
blood, to continue this for an indefinite period? Isn't
that the reason for this -- these decisions and this
current policy?

GEN. EIKENBERRY: Now, Steve, look at the gains
that we have, and I won't repeat those, and I think this
audience is sophisticated enough to know what the baseline
of 2001 in Afghanistan look like. Going forward, I think
that the transition strategy that's been outlined by NATO,
by the United States and agreed to by the Afghans,
sanctioned by the United Nations is a sound way ahead. Is
it risk-free? No, absolutely not.

There's challenges with Pakistan right now. If
Pakistan is not on side, so to speak, this transition
becomes much more problematic in terms of treasure and
more lives. There is challenges with the Afghan National
Security Forces with their sustainability and their
capabilities. There is challenges on the economic domain
that as the level of international largess and aid starts
to decline over the next several years, it's going to have
a very severe shock effect on the Afghan economy.

And fourth and finally, there's problems with
Afghan governance. There are problems with corruption. There's problems with accountability of the government, but to say that at this point, then we need to continue to double down on our efforts, Steve, I think we're at a point in the United States now where -- you know, look at our own economic problems, one -- something that really struck me coming home from so much time overseas is the extent of our economic problems.

We've got infrastructure problems. We've got education problems. I don't think that the United States can afford to continue to invest in campaigns like Iraq and Afghanistan as we have over this past decade. So no, I think that transition has a reasonable possibility of success, but we've reached a point now in terms of our own means that are available and I think frankly in terms of the Afghans that it is time for this transition to take place.

I'm reading right now Ron Chernow's *Washington: A Life*, and I -- came across as he's talking about now dealing with the French -- the American revolutionaries dealing with the French, Washington saying that if we're going to win our liberty, we, the American
revolutionaries, our army, has to be the one to win the battles.

We need the French, but it's ours to win, and so, yeah, I think that we've reached a point where we've done a lot. There's a good foundation. We're going to continue to do more, but it's over to the Afghans at this point.

GEN. LUTE: Steve, if I may just add a thought.

MR. KROFT: Yes.

GEN. LUTE: If you ask Americans in the wake of 9/11 what price would you be willing to pay to buy a decade without a recurrence? And remember those days, I mean, you all have your personal ones. I have my personal memories. Everyone here has personal memories of what happened in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Who would have bought 10 years of safety without a major, another repeat, this -- another significant attack from al-Qaida?

Who would have paid 10 years ago for the dismantlement, the disruption that we see that largely this conference codifies and has acknowledged over the last day and a half of al-Qaida as a movement? So not only have we been safe and those significant losses in
terms of treasure and lives and so forth, but they haven't
-- it hasn't been -- it hasn't gone without value.
I mean we have been safe for 10 years. We've
really gotten after al-Qaida. They're on the edge of
defeat, and quite frankly, as a 10-year investment, as at
least one American here that sounds like a pretty
reasonable price to pay.

MR. KROFT: Do you think it's been worth the
investment?

GEN. LUTE: I think it has --

MR. KROFT: Do you think it's been worth all the
blood and all the treasure?

GEN. LUTE: Well, look. No, I'm never going to
say that because any individual life there -- I mean,
there's probably someone in this audience who lost a loved
one and for that individual, for that family, it's never
going to be worth it, okay. But I'm talking -- the
question had to do with America as a nation.

And America as a nation bought 10 years of
security from al-Qaida and has bought ourselves within
sight of defeating the movement, the core of the movement
in Pakistan and in the Afghan-Pakistan border region. And
to me, never negating or never trying to belittle the individual losses that got us there, it seems to me that that's a national price worth paying.

AMB. HAKIMI: Well --

MR. KROFT: Doug?

AMB. HAKIMI: If I may? Sure.

MR. KROFT: Go ahead.

AMB. HAKIMI: Go ahead.

MR. KROFT: Go ahead. Do you agree also it was worth it?

GEN. EIKENBERRY: I agree. But the way that Doug framed it, again, Steve, if historians and strategists look back over the last 10 years in Iraq and Afghanistan, will they conclude that we needed to spend as much treasure as we did, as many lives, you know, it's hard when you're in the midst of a campaign, when you're at war to try to think through all the uncertainties and come up with the optimal strategy.

However, having said that, I do think that the United States must conduct a good review of the wars that we've fought. You know, just several brief points about this. You know, for instance, the starting point of our
counterinsurgency strategy, a good first principle stated we're there to protect the populations, we accept that.

But what does that really mean, protect the population? Against insurgents? Yes. Against drug cartels? I'm not sure. Against the tribe that's on the other side of the hill that's been at war with the tribe that we're aligned with for the last 500 years? So these are the kind of questions that we develop a doctrine and without questioning that doctrine then we start to accept that as a strategy.

And there's one other point that I think needs to be examined in these wars that we've fought. We've had a contract in the United States over the years between -- an unspoken contract between the civilian leadership and the military leadership of our country. It's Sam Huntington's objective military control. Over the last decade, our military has started to get in more and more areas that go far from the Huntington model of the militaries there to manage violence, and we give them autonomy and oversight in that domain.

My concern is over the last decade and the wars that we fought, our military has gotten into development,
government, anticorruption and on it goes. And then as
that starts to erode from the most specific definition of
what a professional officer corps does, manage violence, I
think accountability begins to suffer in the military
ranks as well.

AMB. HAKIMI: Well, I think that's about time to
remind to American public why U.S. engaged in Afghanistan
in the first place after September 11, and that was
because the U.S. security receives threat from that part
of the world. And terrorist groups, they use that soil
against U.S. and 3,000 innocent Americans here in New
York, they lost their life. Because of that, all these
treasure, all the blood invested there.

And also in Soviet invasion, when Afghans paid
the price, 1 million Afghan died and 1.5 million disabled
and we defeated Soviet Union, at that time also
Afghanistan abandoned. And again 10 years after, U.S.
reengaged. So I think we should be honest to say that the
security of Afghanistan, how it link the security in the
region and also here, security in the U.S.

MR. KROFT: General Lute, you made a reference
earlier to Pakistan --
AMB. REHMAN: Can I come in?

MR. KROFT: Yeah -- no. I have a special question for you, Sherry. You made the statement --

AMB. REHMAN: Yeah.

MR. KROFT: -- Doug, that without the cooperation of Pakistan, this was going to be extremely difficult to do.

Now for Ambassador Rehman, there was a protracted period of time when the United States and Pakistan were allies. That seems to have ended, friends and allies. That seems to have ended. Sixty -- I don't know, I think three out of four people in Pakistan right now according to a Pew public opinion poll consider the United States an enemy of Pakistan and millions of American people are asking the question, is Pakistan friend or foe? What's the answer to that question?

AMB. REHMAN: Very quickly, Steve, we've -- I think Pakistan and the United States have been through an extraordinarily difficult time over the last 7 months. You know that the NATO supply lines that ran through Pakistan for 12 years were suspended. It was suspended not in a fit of pique; they were suspended because we had
24 soldiers killed at the border by NATO and ISAF forces.
Those were unlocked when an apology freed up both sides to take the arc of this relationship to prevent it from spiraling down.

Yes, you have talked about the Pew polls, et cetera, but I think there is still a very strong will and commitment on both sides. And I can certainly speak for Pakistan that we see very little value in not rebuilding our ties with the United States, and of course with Afghanistan. We are, as I said, intensifying our engagement with all our neighbors on both sides and the United States has been an ally and a friend through many phases of our history and relationship.

I sympathize with Ambassador Hakimi who says that, you know, Afghanistan was abandoned. There is a baggage to this issue. There is a problem and Pakistan is very clearly -- I mean, we were at Chicago. We were at the summit to unequivocally declare our support to the project and to say that well, we talked Afghan stability and security to say that, you know, we don't want a repeat of the '90s. We don't want another security vacuum again. We don't want Afghanistan to slide into civil war.
We have the -- a very high stake in Afghan security. It would surge -- insecurity would surge right into Pakistan, and as it is, we stand transformed over the last 30 years. And in 12 years when you say well, you know, al-Qaida, the core of al-Qaida has been defeated, it's been defeated with Pakistan's active and constant, not just attention, but cooperation in the field.

We have, I think, captured and brought to justice or certainly handed over to the Americans over 250 high-value targets, al-Qaida. We now are looking at a degraded core and we hope to be able to defeat them with American cooperation, but without impossible demands such as well, you know, you've got to do more -- everybody has been citing losses and they're very tragic. We empathize and sympathize.

But where's the strategic sympathy for Pakistan having lost 42,000 lives in these last 12 years since we've committed ourselves to this war? You know, this is not a grievance narrative I want to bring to this. We want to engage in a constructive and very concrete conversation where we can take both our gains forward and prepare for a time where the American presence is --
obviously has gone down, but as we're told that there will be some American security presence in Afghanistan, but we hope that once again I say that the capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces and their policing mechanism remain of the quality and caliber that can take on.

What we hear -- for instance, we hear these days, an 11 percent uptick in violence in Afghanistan, insurgent violence and this adds to Pakistan's anxieties and it really is an important spur for us to cooperate, but we do look to the United States to not make what I call an irresponsible exit, and I hope that is the way we will look at it in the future.

GEN. LUTE: Steve, let me just comment. And first of all, underlying what Ambassador Rehman just said about a common interest between our two countries, Pakistan and the United States, and that's the ultimate achievement of this core goal, to defeat al-Qaida. There -- as she rightly says, there have been more al-Qaida leaders and operatives captured and killed in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world.

The other core interest though, common interest
that she highlights is the stability in Afghanistan.
There's no stability in Afghanistan that doesn't involve
Pakistan and there's no stability in Pakistan that doesn't
involve Afghanistan. So we have a common interest to get
this right on both sides of the Durand Line.

MR. KROFT: Secretary of Defense Panetta
indicated that he has no intention or sees no reason to
end the strikes, the drone strikes across the border. And
a question for you, General Eikenberry, there is a doctor,
a Pakistani doctor in prison right now sentenced to 33
years in prison for treason, for assisting Americans in
the search for Osama bin Laden.

What does that say about our relationship with
Pakistan where it would seem that they have more loyalty
to Osama bin Laden than they do to the United States? I
mean you're talking about an international fugitive wanted
all over the world and someone goes to jail and prison for
treason for trying to turn him in.

GEN. EIKENBERRY: Yeah. Steve, I'd defer to the
ambassador on that, but in a word I'd call it outrageous.

MR. KROFT: Can you explain that decision? And
I think this is one of the problems with the relationship
right now, Ambassador, is that Americans look at that
decision. And they say, what's going on inside the
Pakistani government. What's going on inside the courts?
They clearly seem to hate us.

AMB. REHMAN: I -- if I may interject here, I
don't think there's any question of hatred. That's a very
strong emotion, and Pakistanis are right now in a place
where they are looking or we are looking towards our first
democratic transition, civilian peaceful democratic
transition and our institutions are strong. There is a
rule of law model that our courts are working with.

We have recently lost a prime minister to the
actions of -- in the Supreme Court in Pakistan. We are
working according to a constitutional norm. And now when
you talk about Afridi, let me just say very clearly, Dr.
Afridi had no idea he was looking for Osama bin Laden. So
before you valorize his actions, do understand that for
Pakistan, on the ground, he was contracting with a foreign
intelligence agency without anybody's permission there.

He was contracting with militant groups that are
beheading our soldiers or attempting to do so. He was
contracting with many people on the ground and he had no
clue that he was engaged in this historic fight against or
looking for -- search for Osama bin Laden, and I'd also
like to point out that if you remember President Obama's
first speech when Osama bin Laden was found, he very
clearly mentioned Pakistan's cooperation in the effort
leading up to Osama bin Laden's, you know, eventual
killing and search.

So I think that there is no question -- I mean
it really pains me to hear that Pakistan is being put in a
category of a country that is harboring or is looking to
preserve Osama bin Laden, to sanctuary Osama bin Laden. I
mean people like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, all other high-
value targets were found with Pakistan's active
cooperation. Now that is not the profile of a country
that is looking to valorize Osama bin Laden.

He -- we were all excited when Osama bin Laden
was found, but then we discovered that it was without our
active participation. It certainly was with our
assistance at some level and that unfortunate incident did
inflame passions because it represented a strike into
Pakistan which we would have certainly cooperated. We
would have said fine, share the actionable intelligence
with us and we would go after him.

We do not need to valorize people like Dr. Afridi and I can't really say what can or what should be done with him. He is facing the courts. He faces -- I mean, he has access to justice. He will appeal his sentence if he may, and that is really a choice he's got to make. But to tell us that, oh, you know, we can't put -- send to courts a doctor who has put into jeopardy thousands of our children who are now facing a loss of, you know, critical polio vaccines and other aid workers who are now lumped in that spy category.

What Dr. Afridi has done is he has lumped a great deal of our workers on the ground. He's put them in danger, our health workers, our primary vaccinators as well as WHO officials. He's endangered people's lives. We are not a country that is looking to be polio-endemic, and this is one of the charges that, I think, holds up against Dr. Afridi.

It is not about who assisted the United States to find Osama bin Laden. We have been assisting the United States to find Osama bin Laden. And I have to say with due respect that that's -- it's quite outrageous to
say that Pakistan has been harboring people who would act
against the United States, that Pakistan has been, after
all the sacrifice and blood and treasure, $78 billion of
Pakistan spend in 12 years --

MR. KROFT: I think General Eikenberry has
something to say, or Ambassador Eikenberry, I'm sorry.

GEN. EIKENBERRY: Another good thing about
leaving government military service is you get your first
name back.

(Laughter)

MR. KROFT: Karl.

GEN. EIKENBERRY: So Karl is very good. Just
three quick points, and not to disagree with the Pakistani
ambassador. Point number one, look, the U.S. approval
rate, U.S. popularity, favorability ratings in Pakistan
are about 7 percent right now. That's even lower than
U.S. population favorability ratings for our Congress. So
that is very, very low.

(Laughter)

GEN. EIKENBERRY: And it's not entirely due to
Pakistan obviously that those ratings are like that.

Second point is I think for the United States, we're
simply, over the last 10 years, we simply aren't clear what Pakistan's interests are. I'm not sure that the Pakistanis are absolutely clear or unified in this.

On the one hand, if you're Pakistan and you're part of the national security apparatus and you're looking at the potential for a very weak Afghanistan, then staying aligned with the Afghan Taliban makes good sense. It's a good hedge because Afghanistan, if it were to collapse, it's going to once again become the playground of great games.

And so there's an argument that they'd want to hedge. On the other hand you could have a view that the Pakistanis assume that Afghanistan is going to succeed brilliantly and be well aligned with the United States and perhaps India in which case you might want to hedge with the Taliban as well. It's simply their calculus remains very opaque to us.

And then the third point, I think what Ambassador Rehman said about the transition now, this first hopefully successful civilian transition, that's critical. For the United States and our long term relationship with Pakistan, stepping back, we always will
come to the conclusion Pakistan needs to get a strong
civilian accountable government that controls its
military.

But the nature of the relationship with Pakistan
has been one in which the urgent has always trumped what
we know to be the long term strategic important. And the
urgent is most recently -- was the war on terror. And so
then compromises deal directly with the Pakistani
military, deal directly with the Pakistani ISI and, of
course, that makes sense for the United States of America,
as Doug had talked about, with the consequences of 9/11.
But I'm not sure that that is a strategy which 20 years
from now is going to make us any better off.

MR. KROFT: I have one more question. The
United States has been very critical and the press has
been very critical of Pakistan, and particularly for
giving sanctuary on the border. You both, you've all, I'm
guessing, all of you have been to that border region as I
have been. It is a very, very difficult place to defend,
a place politically where the Pakistani government has
almost no power and very little influence.

Is it fair to blame the government of Pakistan
for making that area available when in fact they don't control it and they have sent troops in there a number of different times and sustained very heavy casualties. Is - I guess what I'm saying, is Pakistan been unfairly attacked for the border issue?

GEN. LUTE: You know, Steve, the way we look at this is that sovereignty has privileges but comes with responsibilities, and that's true on both sides of that border. You can't control that border or as far as I can tell any other border, international border, from one side alone. This has to be an effort on both sides of the border. We've been quite deliberate with our support to the Afghan government to do so on its side of the border.

We believe it's Pakistan's sovereign responsibility to do on its side of the border.

Now, even if because of perhaps a hedging approach, which may be outdated now, but even if they could make the case that it's in Pakistan's interest or was in Pakistan's interest at one time to support the Afghan Taliban by way of permitting them sanctuary and so forth, I'd argue that today the Pashtun militancy, the Pakistani Taliban, presents such a significant threat to
Pakistan itself, to the state of Pakistan itself, that whatever that hedging strategy might have meant some time ago no longer makes any sense because there's no way, in our view, to discriminate effectively between the Afghan Taliban in those border regions and the Pakistani Taliban who threaten the Pakistani state itself. So it may be a hedging approach, but if so then it's a hedging approach that is out of date.

MR. KROFT: Ambassador, what do you think?

AMB. HAKIMI: Well, this is something that we have been arguing for quite some time, that from the safe haven on the other side of the Durand Line, our opposition forces, they receive financial support, they receive equipment and also they receive training. Initially, nobody wanted to admit this. Now, everybody agree. Our partners, initially they didn't want to acknowledge, but now everybody is pointing the finger that that's the area we should deal with. This is a fact. You cannot ignore that.

MR. KROFT: And this aid is being channeled through the ISI and the intelligence agencies right now?

AMB. HAKIMI: Well, Chairman Mullen, he clearly
mentioned, of course, in the last days in his office, that Haqqani Network is an inevitable arm of ISI. We have been receiving promises from our Pakistani friends that they will do something and we are hopeful that there are some practical steps toward that and it's not that difficult to say that Taliban are not welcome to use Pakistani soil against Afghanistan publicly and do something practically to stop that which is not happening. There are a lot of promises, but it's better to be under-promised and over-delivered.

GEN. LUTE: You know, Steve, this --

AMB. REHMAN: May I just? Excuse me. May I just add voice to what Ambassador Hakimi is saying? Pakistan has very clearly and unequivocally said that we would be very happy to assist Afghanistan -- Afghan forces and NATO-ISAF forces, but we have not seen any serious interdictions on that border. For instance, if I may say, that we have a question of sanctuary of the Haqqani Network.

We are also not clear about what U.S. policy over the last few years, where it's going. There is opacity there too. We are asked to assist in the
reconciliation or rather the peace talks that are going on
and we certainly are assisting at every level with the
High Peace commission and other conversations, but we --
at the heart of this, and you mentioned this, Steve, at
the heart of this assumption here is that 49 nations with
their $400 billion have not been able to accomplish X goal
in Afghanistan and somehow Pakistan should manage that
with its 150,000 troops committed to the border.

And when we talk to the American military here,
we get some level of strategic sympathy because they are
very clear that as everybody says, Pakistan is maxed out
on the international border with Afghanistan, and for
instance, we have given -- when we run border operations,
our military runs extensive anti-terrorist operations.

I'll give you two examples, Bajaur and Malakand.
We displaced hundreds and thousands of refugees in our own
country, hosting them, shifting them out of huge swades
(phone tic) of area, and what do we get? We get the
terrorists that we have smoked out, not being anviled on
the other side, and we are now only able -- and so at the
heart of this whole argument is a flawed assumption that
Pakistan's capacity is limitless.
Of course, to us this war is -- our commitment to fighting terrorism is open-ended, our militaries and our own as well as the civilian governments so the United States can walk away, others can walk away to some extent. We can't walk away from it. We will have to face all the -- we are in the trenches, on the front lines.

And I'll give you an example. This -- over the last eight months when we have incurred constant firing and attacks, and these are critical masses of people that come in. This is not just potshots. This is not people going across the border, coming back. We have informed U.S. and NATO forces at least 52 times formally on longitude and latitude of where are the terrorists that run from our area.

So what is the -- we need hammer and anvil if we're going to operate on that border to some effect and manage to interdict those that we need to interdict. So we shouldn't be getting this constant message that Pakistan has just got to do everything on its side of the border. We clean out people. They go sit there in sanctuary in Nuristan and Kunar.

We don't say that it's active sanctuary. We
assume it's a capacity problem. We assume it's a sequencing issue. So we would assume at least that amount of strategic sympathy be given to Pakistan, and that's really why you see ratings slip because you see this American ratings, if you see this public messaging, which is constantly assuming that Pakistan should mop up where everybody else leaves off.

We can't do this alone. We need -- that's why we need a partnership. That's why we need to focus on goals that are concrete and deliverable. That's why we need our militaries to act in complement to each other, not in areas where we're -- if we're operating in the south, then it would be a good idea if they operate in the south. If we've shut off our communication towers in all the Waziristan areas, it's a good idea if the Afghan side also does that.

One of the ways to triangulate terrorists is through their conversations. And I'm sure that all these tasks can be achieved. We have, what, over -- about nearly a 1,000 border check posts on our side of the border, but we are offered about one-tenth of that on the NATO ISAF side. So here is a question of what is a
priority. We've had drone attacks, over 250, in the North Waziristan area. So if Haqqani is sitting there and we are unable to take them on or smoke them out, then what did those attacks do? So I --

MR. KROFT: Ambassador, we have just -- we want to turn this over to the audience for questions and I have a couple of more areas, couple of more questions I want to raise. You want to --

GEN. LUTE: I have to just reply to Ambassador Rehman though. There's no comparison of the Pakistani Taliban, relatively recent, small-in-scale presence inside Afghanistan, and in particular in these two remote provinces, Kunar and Nuristan, to the decades long experience and relationship between elements of the Pakistani government and the Afghan Taliban. So to compare these is simply, I think, unfair.

GEN. EIKENBERRY: Steve, if I could also interject.

MR. KROFT: Go ahead.

GEN. EIKENBERRY: You led with how difficult the terrain is, and I think Ambassador, you, you Steve, and Doug and I and probably Ambassador Rehman has all been up
there. And look, it's like telling a bunch of young
captains or majors that are going to fight up there, you
know, welcome to these outpost on the moon and now defend
this. It is extraordinarily difficult terrain. We
understand that.

But against that, my second point is that let's
take the Haqqani headquarters in Miram Shah. In Miram
Shah, about a kilometer away from the Haqqani's main
activity is the headquarters of the Ninth Infantry
Division of the Pakistani army. Pakistan has suffered
great losses in the war on terror. I do not dispute that.
And that due credit needs to be given.

But I have to say from my perspective a very
good start for Pakistan, unambiguous would be say we're
not going to go in and fight because it will be a very
tough fight, but what we will do, we'll call in the Afghan
Taliban leadership and we will tell them you have several
choices to make right now. You can stop fighting and
begin peace negotiations. You cannot fight from our soil.
You can put down your weapons and we can see if we can
integrate you into Pakistan, or number three, you can go
into Afghanistan and continue to fight, but not from our
soil.

AMB. REHMAN: We are very happy to do that and I welcome that suggestion. This is certainly the position of the Pakistan government today. We don't welcome a sanctuary for foreign fighters on our soil. They challenge writ of our state as much as they challenge lives in Afghanistan and that is very clear. There is no question right now of hedging bets. We are not betting on anyone clear.

We are very careful now that even when we have high level visits, the entire focus is not one group. We make sure that the prime minister or the foreign minister meet with everybody. We make sure that we are engaged with the Afghan government, and Kabul is in constant conversation with us now in terms of how to move forward.

And I would like to point this group forward towards moving from a security transition to talk of peace because there needs to be less of a mixed signal. We are told that, look, you know, please if you can bring so and so to talk to the table, including the Haqqani Network. Now, this assumes that we can always bring everybody to the table. I'm not sure that we can.
This also assumes that we have a high stake in Afghan peace and a model which is inclusive and that brings Afghanistan into the future as a modern developing emerging democracy, yes, we have a stake in that. And we are very clear that that is the model we would like to invest in and be partners of. But we are not making Afghanistan our strategic backyard, so there is no betting on the Taliban.

The Taliban challenge us as much as they challenge Afghanistan, and if there are those that seek to reconcile then they must do so according to the constitution of Pakistan. There are certain areas, our tribal areas, which as you say are not easy to govern. They couldn't be governed by many before us or before Pakistan became Pakistan.

We are seeking to enhance our writ. It has to be incremental, and we can't be asked to bomb people all on our own while others hang back. So I think it's a question of priorities being developed on both sides and this would be a constructive time to do so now that our NATO supplies are open, now that there is will on both sides to begin a new road towards building equities for
peace in the region. And that includes India as well as Pakistan. We are making great strides in terms of opening up our trade and other conversations for peace with India. So this is a new Pakistan. Catch up, gentlemen.

MR. KROFT: I want to --

(Laughter)

MR. KROFT: I want to ask what are the realistic chances of some sort of meaningful negotiations between the Taliban and whoever, Afghanistan, the United States, Pakistan, some combination of those, to bring about some sort of a political resolution or a ceasefire, some sorts of -- some sort of outcome that might end this for the Afghan people? What do you think? We'll start with you, Ambassador.

AMB. HAKIMI: Peace process has two tiers. One is reintegration and one is the reconciliation. In the reintegration front we have achieved a lot; a reintegration designed to bring the foot soldiers within the system. With that in mind, those that they renounce violence, they cut tie with al-Qaida and they accept Afghan constitution, they are more than welcome to reintegrate.
So more than 4,000 Taliban foot soldiers already joined this program and they enjoy the facilities that we have provided. On the reconciliation front however, there are a lot of talks, there are a lot of discussions, but this is a process. If you assume to achieve something overnight, it's not going to happen.

We have opened different channel of communications with them. Most recently in Kyoto, in Doshisha University, Taliban represented for the first time in one room was engaging with High Peace Council from our government. It was not a negotiation, but at least exchange of views, that everybody made their points clear.

So we think that with the support of again our Pakistani friends there, they have been saying that they are supporting Afghan-led Afghan peace process, which we appreciate, and we are willing to see some practical steps that they have something in stake and they can play a crucial role. So it's something that's going on and this is one of the top priorities in our government's program to succeed that.

And within Taliban also there are moderators that they want to join and there are some that they still
insist on the military operations. So there are signs that make us believe that things that we have initiated that will bring some fruitful result at the end.

MR. KROFT: Doug, I'm interested in what you think on this but first answer for me the question why would the Taliban want to enter into negotiations at a time when the United States is scaling back and withdrawing its troops, and by the end of 2014 will be down to no combat troops, why wouldn't they want to take a chance and see how good the Afghan army is before they start thinking about some kind of a --

GEN. LUTE: Right. Well, see, they may want to take a chance. But what we've made clear, what President Obama has made clear is that the door is open to another possibility and that is a negotiated political process that could leave for the Afghan-Taliban, especially the leadership who are outside Afghanistan itself and not subject to the pressure of the military campaign, leave open for them a door back into the political process in Afghanistan.

Now, that's not -- it's not free. They've got to meet three end conditions. They've got to break ties
with al-Qaida, they've got to stop the insurgency, stop the fighting, and when they come back to Afghanistan, they've got to do so inside the framework of the Afghan constitution. So there's some end conditions to this notion of reconciliation or the top down process. Why would they think about doing this? First of all, their movements are being hammered every day and every night by not only 100,000 NATO led ISAF troops, but now approaching 350,000 Afghan forces. So they are under extreme military pressure. In fact, this is one of the design features of the military campaign, to put sufficient military pressure on the movement so that the door that President Obama has opened to political process looks attractive. Another reason they might have to is that increasingly as we transition from our being in the lead to the Afghan forces being in the lead, the Taliban narrative of counter occupation or the Taliban narrative of jihad against the West begins to erode because now increasingly they are fighting Afghan forces, fellow Afghans, not American forces. And then finally, we believe that by way of our
partnership with Afghanistan, which Ambassador Hakimi outlined, and by the way not only with the U.S. but about eight other countries in the NATO alliance as a whole, signals to the Taliban that they can't wait us out. So if they like the current situation, living in some sort of safe haven although probably as second class citizens in Pakistan, and if they want to continue another decade of this and if they want their force to continue to be hammered every day and every night increasingly by Afghans, then the door would remain open until they see otherwise.

GEN. EIKENBERRY: And Steve, if we go back to how we opened talking about progress that has been made, if you go to the urban areas, the big urban areas of Afghanistan, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad, things have transformed since 2001, a lot of young people there that have a very different world view. I think for the Taliban to believe that they could claim all of that back again and impose their order, that's a stretch.

Does that mean that as we go forward with transition, there will be problems -- there won't be problems with insecurity and bad governance in those urban
areas? No, it does not. But here I'm talking about
Taliban. So then three points going forward with talks
with the Taliban and the importance of them and what can
be achieved.

Number one, to agree with what Doug had laid
out, and that is that very importantly if we get this
transitioned right, then Taliban's narrative is
evaporating every day as the Afghans move to the lead.

Number two, it does make the point then, it drives home
the point, that we've really got to get this enduring or
the longer term presence right because that longer term
presence that we have after 2014, security assistance,
maybe counterterrorism, what does that add up to along
with amount of developmental assistance, reassurance to
the Afghans, which gives them the political confidence for
dialogue also the right incentives to the Taliban that we
are not leaving and perhaps the right incentives to
Pakistan.

And then the third and final point though is as
we talk about a political settlement, I think we sometimes
overstate this as a question of Taliban versus all the
rest, Taliban versus the rest of the Afghan body politic.
My own view is that Afghanistan writ large going back to the troubled times of the mid 1970s, the Afghan body politic need reconciliation among themselves.

And I increasingly look at the Taliban dialogue perhaps as a subset of a larger dialogue that has to take place. Remember, let's be clear, the Taliban when it advanced in the mid-1990s to take control of a lot of parts of Afghanistan in their initial fighting, they were welcome as liberators, liberation from the rapine of some very vicious warlords whose depredations had opened the door to Taliban.

Now, Taliban have great misrule themselves. Let's also be clear that some of those warlords whose depredations led to the rise of the Taliban occupy positions of formal and informal power in Afghanistan today. So the problem goes beyond just the Taliban.

MR. KROFT: One last question; then we've got to go to the questions from the floor. There has been -- there are people that believe this whole situation could fall back into civil war. That after the United States leaves and the stability that it has provided there in terms of security anyway, that you run the risk of these
warlords and tribal groups that have been at each other's throats for -- in some cases for centuries, are going to reemerge and people are going to leave the Taliban and end up -- and everything is just going to go back to the way it was. Is that a real concern?

AMB. HAKIMI: Well, first of all, if I may --

MR. KROFT: And try and keep this short.

AMB. HAKIMI: In Afghanistan, before Soviet invasion, we lived with each other peacefully. And Afghanistan before invasion, if you see the history there, we had a constitution, a moderate society, rule of law, a proper justice system and Afghanistan active member of international community. And this perception that Afghanistan was -- within Afghanistan tribes fighting with each other, I think that's not right.

When Soviet invasion happened, from that point on until the civil war and so on, for the last 30 years or so, we -- fighting imposed on us. Before that, we were a peaceful society. We lived side by side for years. And from now on also this is something that we believe, we, I mean, Afghan people, that we don't want to go back to those dark days and we are looking for a bright future.
And if I may, one point I want to make about corruption, that most recently we had a very successful conference in Tokyo, an international conference that more than 70 countries came and they pledged to support Afghanistan for the next 40 years for $16 billion, and there we agreed about mutual accountability, that we do certain things while our international partners will do certain things.

And most recently like 2, 3 days ago, our president already issued a decree with 23 very ambitious measures to fight corruption drastically across the line in judicial system, our line ministries and all others to the point that we should give that satisfaction to our partners and also to our own people.

MR. KROFT: From the former U.S. military people, do you think that's a realistic scenario, the civil war?

GEN. EIKENBERRY: Several points I'd make. The first is, and I agree with Ambassador Hakimi, the Afghans are tired of war and they have many adults who in their life time have seen the tragedy of civil war in Taliban occupation. Secondly, there's no neighbors of Afghanistan
that are pulling at any of the domestic groups, the ethnic
groups of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is blessed in that
way, a fractious set of ethnic groups, but with a
surprising sense of nationalism underlying it.

And then third, quick vignette if I could,
Steve, in 2006, I went to the Town of Gardez, where the
two of first Afghan National Army headquarters was
located. I went there with the then National Security
Advisor Steve Hadley, and we visited a Major General Rufi
(phonetic) in command. Steve asked a question through an
interpreter; General Rufi, what are you most proud of?
And he said, I'm most proud of the staff officers in the
room, that personnel officers at Hazara, that intelligence
officers at Tajik, that operations officers in Uzbek, and
we were fighting each other, about 10 years ago.

Steve asked the question then, well, what do you
worry about the most? He said I worry you Americans will
leave before it's time. I've been in Afghanistan a lot at
that point, many years, and I thought Rufi was saying
before we've gotten all the equipment to them, before all
the barracks are built, I was wrong.

Rufi explained it and said, I'll go back to what
I'm most proud of is that we are not ready yet to work
together. We don't have the level of trust and
certainty. We need you here for a longer period of time
for us to achieve that. My view is you don't need a
100,000 United States troops in order to achieve that.
You can be clever. And I think that the Afghans do want
us to have a much smaller footprint in their country than
we do today.

GEN. LUTE: Steve, I'd only add that given the
level of development of Afghan's -- of the Afghan
political structure, civil war might be a risk if we
didn't have a deliberate transition process over the next
30 months. And if we didn't, even beyond that transition
process, plan today for a sustained U.S. supportive role
alongside the NATO alliance, and today some 50 other
countries who have said essentially we are not going to
replay 1989. So 2014 is not a 25-year break from 1989,
and we're just going to repeat the tragic history when the
Russians left.

MR. KROFT: Okay, we want to take some questions
from the floor. We have people with microphones. You --
let's start here in the middle.
MR. PLACIDO: Good afternoon, Tony Placido, formerly with DEA. A question for General Eikenberry. General, if I understood you correctly, you at least questioned the utility of engaging the narcotics traffickers or the drug trade in Afghanistan. My question is, is it really feasible to consolidate the gains that we have made with such blood and treasure without dealing with the narcotics trade, which fuels the insurgency, promotes corruption of public officials and institutions, undermines public confidence and generally challenges rule of law?

GEN. EIKENBERRY: Yeah, Tony, I didn't -- and thanks for raising that point. I certainly didn't mean to communicate that the war against drugs in Afghanistan is not vital for Afghanistan's success and stability and an important national interest of our own. I was talking about the lose definition of a military doctrine. But the approaches that DEA has had in countries like Columbia and has in Afghanistan, they must be continued. They must absolutely be continued. Still Afghanistan produces 90 percent of the world's poppy. We think of every say $10 of corruption
that exist with those poppy dollars or Afghani inside of Afghanistan, $7 of them are going to the police of Afghanistan, to the government of Afghanistan, to informal power brokers, $3 of those are going to the Taliban. So this is a very serious problem, that because of the existence of the drug trafficking and its perversion of the economy and politics, I don't know how you can eventually stabilize Afghanistan unless you continue those efforts.

MR. KROFT: Well, over here.

MR. GENEST: Mark Genest of the Naval War College. I have a question regarding the lessons learned from Afghanistan. We chose a strategy in the last 4 or 5 years in Afghanistan, the heavy footprint coin with lots of troops, over a 100,000 troops, and national building strategy. Looking back at it, would it have been wiser had we diminished the role of heavy footprint using small footprint strategy and not promising nation building because it looks like we over-promised and under-
delivered?

GEN. LUTE: Well, let me take a stab at that. I mean, the two lessons that I carry around in my notebook,
which are overwhelming for me, having been somewhat involved with Afghanistan since 2004, is first the overwhelming importance of understanding the situation on the ground. And I am still dissatisfied with the level of our understanding where the rubber meets the road in a counterinsurgency approach.

We don't adequately understand the languages, we don't understand the culture, we don't at many times understand the history. We leave Afghanistan -- if you're an American diplomat or an American soldier, one year at a time. The odds of that diplomat or solider ever going back to that same area in Afghanistan is almost zero. So when we enter a campaign like this, the overriding lesson for me is that we better understand what we're getting into and what it's going to take to be successful and to be effective there.

And then the second thing I'd add in terms of quick lessons is a point that spins off of something John Negroponte mentioned, with regard to our experience in Iraq, and that is as soon as we begin one of these campaigns, we've got to begin to invest immediately in the indigenous security forces, because the tolerance, the
level of tolerance, for our presence and the kind of numbers we've had recently will only go down over time. So the early investment, the smart investment, would have been in the years from 2001 to 2006, for example, would've been a much more heavy and concerted focused effort on Afghan security forces, not just the kind of focus we've seen in the last couple of years.

GEN. EIKENBERRY: Steve, I would say that the approach that we've tried in Iraq and Afghanistan and used there -- which again only historians 20-25 years from now will be able to fairly evaluate. Has it been resource intensive? Yeah, I've heard some people describe it as trying to achieve revolutionary aims through colonial means. And we need to think about that.

But then you also think that even the colonial ways and means that we've adopted were not sufficient at all. Again, back to Chernow's Life -- *Washington: A Life*; by the way, I've read more than that book -- but he's talking about his experiences with raising the troops, raising the colonial troops. And he said in frustration in a letter to the Continental Congress, I spend -- in these 1-year enlistments I spend 6 months getting the
troops ready and 6 months thinking about how to demobilize them and our approach in Afghanistan, military and civilian, but we could go on with a very long list.

The second would be that we better need to, I think as -- before we plunge deep into an Iraq or Afghanistan, have a more frank debate about ends, ways and means. And you know, do we need to go back and dust off the Weinberger and Powell doctrines, again, I'm not sure here. And perhaps a third point about these kinds of conflicts, let me ask people in this audience, we have an all-volunteer force which is absolutely magnificent. They perform brilliantly. It's not a conscript army.

If we had a conscript army good enough to do the job, that's a heroic assumption. But if it was a conscript army good enough to do the job, raise your hand if you think we would've invaded Iraq. Raise your hand if you think 10 years after the intervention in Afghanistan we would have had a 100,000 troops there with a conscript army directly connected to the American people through the populous, through their Congress.

So if the answer to that is no, and maybe there's some hands that would go up, but I think the
majority would stay down, then there might be something wrong with the Republic if over the last 10 years we've been heavily engaged in war with volunteer forces that are not politically owned by the American people.

MR. KROFT: Try over here. Oh.

MS. DOZIER: Thank you. Kim Dozier, AP, about to make two enemies with this question. General Lute, will unilateral U.S. counterterrorist actions, otherwise known as drone strikes, continue in the FATA? And Ambassador Rehman, what actions will Pakistan take if the drone strikes continue? Thanks.

GEN. LUTE: So our cooperation with Pakistan against al-Qaida leaders today in the border region continues. Obviously, I'm not going to talk just as no one else in this conference has talked about, the specifics. And the reason they continue is that the United States and Pakistan have a common interest here. As I think Ambassador Rehman outlined quite clearly, we've had no more active partner in the fight against al-Qaida than the Pakistanis, and that common interest continues today and that level -- those levels of cooperation that cross different programs across time also continues. So
I'll let Sherry speak for herself.

AMB. REHMAN: Thank you. Very quickly, Doug, I appreciate what you just said. I think that in Pakistan the view now is very, very clear and unambiguous that drones and drone attacks test the relationship. This is because -- not because we don't want to hurt al-Qaida, but because number one, the drone strikes now see diminishing returns as we all acknowledge al-Qaida is -- the core of al-Qaida is all but eliminated.

Also they now radicalize more swades (phonetic) of the population, of the locals, where these strikes happen. And I don't want to get into the specifics of what collateral damage happened or how precise these weapons are. What they do now is they add to the pool of recruits that we are fighting against, and this is what unfortunately inflames public sentiment that the site of that drone, the robotic warfare that from somewhere else across the world is, you know, it opens up all kinds of questions of moral hazard when some -- when another country does this. And there are many questions that open up.

Our position is that this is a problem. And no
wonder then that you have this view of the United States as having a large predatory footprint, though drones when they hover above us, I'm not saying that this is because they don't -- they haven't assisted in the war against terror. The point is that they now have diminishing returns, and that's a very clear point. We could be seeking an end to drone strikes and there will be no compromise on that. Thank you.

MR. KROFT: That's -- I'm sorry, that's all we have time for. I want to thank our panelists and Ambassador Rehman for joining us today, and she knew that she was going to get some heat and wanted to come and take it any way and have the opportunity to present her government's views. But thank you very much for coming and see you next time.

(Applause)

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